Financial Stability Report. November 2018 by Banco de España
FINANCIAL STABILITY 
REPORT 
11/2018

FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT  NOVEMBER 2018

FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT  NOVEMBER 2018
The cut-off date of this report: 30 October 2018.
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes  
is permitted provided that the source is acknowledged.
© Banco de España, Madrid, 2018
ISSN: 1696-3520 (online)
ABBREVIATIONS (*)
€   Euro
AIAF  Asociación de Intermediarios de Activos Financieros (Association of Securities Dealers)
ABCP Asset-backed commercial paper
ATA  Average total assets
BCBS  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BIS  Bank for International Settlements
BLS  Bank Lending Survey
bn   Billions
bp   Basis points
BRRD Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive
CBE  Banco de España Circular
CBSO  Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCyB Countercyclical capital buffer
CCR  Banco de España Central Credit Register
CDO  Collateralised debt obligation
CDS  Credit Default Swap
CEBS  Committee of European Banking Supervisors
CEIOPS  Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
CET1 Common equity Tier 1 capital
CIs  Credit institutions
CNMV  Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (National Securities Market Commission)
CPSS  Basel Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems
DIs  Deposit institutions
EAD  Exposure at default
EBA European Banking Authority
ECB  European Central Bank
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMEs  Emerging market economies
EMU  Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESFS  European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB  European Systemic Risk Board
ESTER Euro short-term rate
EU  European Union
FASB  Financial Accounting Standards Board
FLESB Forward-Looking Exercise on Spanish Banks
FROB  Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector
FSA  Financial Services Authority
FSAP  Financial Sector Assessment Program
FSB  Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
FSR  Financial Stability Report
FVC  Financial vehicle corporation
GAAP Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
GDI  Gross disposable income
GDP  Gross domestic product
GHOS  Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision
G-SIIs Global systemically important institutions
GVA  Gross value added
GVAmp  Gross value added at market prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board
ICO  Instituto Oficial de Crédito (Official Credit Institute)
ID   Data obtained from individual financial statements
IFRSs  International Financial Reporting Standards
IMF  International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
IOSCO  International Organization of Securities Commissions
ISDA International Swaps and Derivatives Association
JST Joint Supervisory Team
LGD  Loss given default
(*)  The latest version of the explanatory notes and of the glossary can be found in the November 2006 edition of 
the Financial Stability Report.
LTROs Longer-term refinancing operations
LTV  Loan-to-value ratio (amount lent divided by the appraised value of the real estate used as collateral)
m   Millions
MiFID  Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
MMFs  Money market funds
MREL Minimum Requirement for own funds and Eligible Liabilities
NPISHs  Non-profit institutions serving households
NPLs  Non-performing loans
OFIs Other financial intermediaries
OMT Outright Monetary Transactions
OTC  Over the counter
PD  Probability of default
PER  Price earnings ratio
pp   Percentage points
RDL Royal Decree-Law
ROA  Return on assets
ROE  Return on equity
RWA  Risk-weighted assets
SCIs  Specialised credit institutions
SMEs  Small and medium-sized enterprises
SIV  Structured investment vehicle
SPV  Special purpose vehicle
SRI Systemic Risk Indicator
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TA   Total assets
TARP  Troubled Asset Relief Program
TLTROs Targeted Longer-term Refinancing Operations
VaR  Value at risk
WTO  World Trade Organisation
ISO COUNTRY CODES
AT  Austria
BE  Belgium
BG  Bulgaria
BR  Brazil
CH  Switzerland
CL  Chile
CN  China
CY  Cyprus
CZ  Czech Republic
DE  Germany
DK  Denmark
EE  Estonia
ES  Spain
FI  Finland
FR  France
GB  United Kingdom
GR  Greece
HR  Croatia
HU  Hungary
IE  Ireland
IT  Italy
JP  Japan
KY  Cayman Islands
LT  Lithuania
LU  Luxembourg
LV  Latvia
MT  Malta
MX  Mexico
NL  Netherlands
NO  Norway
PL  Poland
PT  Portugal
RO  Romania
SE  Sweden
SI  Slovenia
SK  Slovakia
TR  Turkey
US  United States
CONTENTS
 
1 1.1 Financial markets   21
1.2 Macroeconomic environment  28
 2.1 Banking risks  37
2.2 Profitability  62
2.3 Solvency  65
2.4 Forward-looking assessment of the Spanish banking system’s  
resilience to adverse macroeconomic scenarios  70
2.5 Results of the European-level stress test published by the European  
Banking Authority  77
 3.1 Analysis of systemic vulnerabilities  79
 
 
 Annex 1. Consolidated balance sheet  85
 Annex 2. Consolidated income statement  86
OVERVIEW  17
    MACROECONOMIC 
RISKS AND 
FINANCIAL 
MARKETS   21
2   BANKING RISKS, 
PROFITABILITY  
AND SOLVENCY  37
3   MACROPRUDENTIAL 
ANALYSIS AND 
POLICY  79
4   ANNEx  85

Table 1 Risk factors  18
Chart A CET1 Ratio. European comparison. SSM countries and United Kingdom 19
Chart B Year-on-year rate of change in credit for purchase of consumer durables 
and in the related NPLs  19
Chart C Banking-sector stock market indices  19
Chart D Premia on 5-year bank CDS  19
Chart E Exchange rate depreciation and external vulnerability  20
Chart F Porfolio capital flows towards emerging markets  20
Chart 1.1 Financial market indicators  22
  A Stock market indices 
 B Exchange rate against the dollar
 C Long-term interest rates
 D Corporate spreads
 E Exchange rate depreciation and external vulnerability
 F Porfolio capital flows towards emerging economies
 G Eurostoxx index. Banks
 H Premia on 5-years bank CDS
Chart 1.2 Developments in the global economy  29
 A Year-on-year GDP growth in the advanced economies
 B Year-on-year GDP growth in the emerging economies
 C Global PMI
 D Contribution to trade growth 
 E Official interest rates. Advanced economies
 F Exchange rates against the dollar
Chart 1.3 Emerging economies indicators  30
 A Change (%) in emerging economies indicators
 B Net capital flows to emerging economies
 C EMBI
 D Policy rates: emerging economies
Chart 1.4 GDP growth, inflation and forecasts  32
 A Euro area. GDP growth
 B Spain. GDP growth
 C Euro area. HICP growth
 D Spain. CPI growth
Chart 1.5 Spanish economy. Non-financial sectors and external sector  33
 A Labour market
 B Real estate market. House prices
 C Debt
 D Public sector and external sector
Chart 2.1 International exposure. Financial assets   37
Chart 2.2 International exposure. Geographical breakdown of loans   38
 A Geographical breakdown of loans
 B Geographical breakdown of loans by counterparty
LIST OF CHARTS AND TABLES
Chart 2.3 International exposure. Loans. Year-on-year rates of change in euros  38
Chart 2.4 Exposure to Turkey and change in share price of bank with biggest exposure 
to that country   39
 A Total exposure to Turkey 
 B Change in share price
Chart 2.5 International exposure. Activity in local currency   39
 A International exposure by currency
 B International exposure by currency. Geographical breakdown
Chart 2.6 International exposure. Non-performing loans   42
 A Changes in NPL ratio abroad
 B Changes in NPL volume abroad
Chart 2.7 Credit to the resident private sector. Year-on-year rate of change   43
 A Year-on-year rate of change in credit to resident private sector, by institutional sector
 B Year-on-year rate of change in credit to resident private sector, by sector of activity
 C Year-on-year rate of change in credit to resident private sector, by institutional sector
       and by sector of activity
Chart 2.8 Credit to the resident private sector   44
 A Distribution of credit to construction and real estate activities, by rate of change 
 B Distribution of credit to the resident private sector, excluding construction and real
      state activities, by rate of change
Chart 2.9 Credit to non-financial firms   48
 A Year-on-year rate of change in credit, by size of firm
 B Breakdown of lending to SMEs, by size of firm
Chart 2.10 New loans granted to the resident private sector 49
 A New loans in the first half of the year, by institutional sector
 B New loans granted, accumulated over the year
 C Amount of new operations granted to non-financial firms in the first half of the year,
      by size of firm
 D New loans granted, accumulated over the year, to large firms and SMEs
Chart 2.11 Credit conditions  50
 A Acceptance rate of loan applications
 B New loan interest rates (APR)
 C Loan-to-value of new mortgages
 D Distribution of loan-to-value ratio for new mortgages
Chart 2.12 Non-performing loans. Resident private sector   51
 A Non-performing loans by sector of activity
 B Year-on-year rate of change in NPLs, by sector of activity
 C Distribution of the rate of change of NPLs
 D Distribution of the rate of changes of NPLs excluding construction and real estate
      activities
Chart 2.13 Flow of resident private sector NPLs between December 2013 and June 2018  54
Chart 2.14 NPL ratio. Resident private sector   55
 A NPL ratio
 B NPL ratio, by sector of activity
Chart 2.15 NPL ratio of non-financial firms  56
 A NPL ratio, by size of firm
 B Year-on-year change in the NPL ratio
Chart 2.16 Forclosed assets between December 2011 and December 2017  56
Chart 2.17 Systemic risk  57
 A  Systemic risk indicator (SRI)
 B Contribution of Spanish banks to systemic risk measured through CoVaR
Chart 2.18 Wholesale funding  58
 A Eonia trading volume
 B Eurosystem balance sheet and liquidity surplus
 C Outstanding amount provided through Eurosystem tenders
 D Main issues of Spanish deposit institutions in medium- and long-term wholesale
      markets
Chart 2.19 International exposure. Financial liabilities. Deposits  60
Chart 2.20 International exposure. Geographical breakdown of deposits  60
 A Geographical breakdown of deposits
 B Geographical breakdown of deposits by counterparty
Chart 2.21 Retail funding  61
 A Change in deposits from households and non-financial corporations, and interest
      rates on outstanding amounts
 B Loan-to-deposit ratio in relative terms 
 C Net asset value of investment funds
 D Contribution of returns and of net subscriptions to change in net asset value
      of investment funds
Chart 2.22 Consolidated profitability  62
 A Breakdown fo the change in consolidated profit attributable to the parent institution
      in June 2018 with respect to June 2017
 B Financial asset impairment losses as a % of ATA
Chart 2.23 Profitability. European comparison. SSM countries and United Kingdom  63
 A ROE
 B ROA
 C Cost-to-income ratio
Chart 2.24 Profitability  64
 A Financial revenue and costs and net interest income
 B Net fee and commission income. As amount and percent of gross income
 C Breakdown of net fee and commission income
 D Number of employees and branches. 2002-2018
Chart 2.25 Market information 65
 A Banking-sector stock market indices
 B Price-to-book-value ratio of the banking sector
Chart 2.26 Capital ratios  66
Chart 2.27 Breakdown of own funds and risk-weighted assets 67
 A Levels of capital and risk exposure
 B Breakdown of own funds
 C Brealdown of CET1 ratio as % of RWAs
 D Breakdown of risk-weighted assets
Chart 2.28 Solvency. European comparison. SSM countries and United Kingdom 68
 A CET 1 ratio
 B TIER 1 ratio
 C Total capital ratio
 D Leverage ratio
Chart 2.29 Evolution of capital ratios over time 69
 A Evolution of TIER 1 capital ratio and total capital ratio over time
 B Breakdown of the change in CET1 ratio between June 2014 and June 2018.
      Change in numerator and denominator
 C Breakdown of change in CET1 ratio between June 2014 and June 2018 as % of RWAs
Chart 2.30 FLESB 73
 A Forecasted year-on-year rate of change of GDP under baseline
      and adverse scenarios
 B Forecasted unemployed rate under baseline and adverse scenarios
 C Forecasted year-on-year rate of change of house prices under baseline
      and adverse scenarios
 D Forecasted 3-month interbank rate under baseline and adverse scenarios
Chart 2.31 Liquidity stress test scenario. Percentage of outflows of funds by type of deposit and 
by scenario 74
Chart 2.32 Impact on CET1 FL ratio. Institutions with significant international activity 75
 A Baseline scenario
 B Adverse scenario
Chart 2.33 Impact on CET1 FL ratio. Other SSM institutions 75
 A Baseline scenario
 B Adverse scenario
Chart 2.34 Impact on CET1 FL ratio. Less significant institutions 76
 A Baseline scenario
 B Adverse scenario
Chart 2.35 Impact on LCR ratio 77
 A Institutions under SSM supervision
 B Less significant institutions
Chart 2.36 EBA stress test results 78
 A Baseline scenario
 B Adverse scenario
Chart 2.37 Results of the EBA stress test exercise. Comparison by country 78
Chart 3.1 Heat map levels  79
Chart 3.2 Heat map by sub-category  80
Chart 3.3 Credit-to-GDP gap  81
 A Credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-term trend
 B Change in credit-to-GDP gap and contribution of its components
Chart 3.4 Complementary indicators for CCyB decisions  82
 A Indicators of house price imbalances
 B Current account balance
 C Credit intensity
 D Private sector debt burden
LIST OF BOxES
Box 1.1 Determinants of the low level of the slope of the yield curve in the United States
 and Germany  23
 A  Spread between 10-year and 1-year rates
 B Interest rates. United States
 C  Interest rates. Germay
 D Estimated term risk premium
 E  Interest rates expectations. United States
 F  Interest rates expectations. Germany
Box 1.2 The political and fiscal uncertainty in Italy and the repercussions on financial 
markets  26
 A  Yield on italian sovereign debt
 B Italy. Balance of payments. Portfolio investment
 C  Italian banks’ acquisitions of domestic public debt
 D 10-year sovereign yields
 E  Sensitivity of sovereign risk (bank risk) to bank risk (sovereign risk)
 F Sensitivity of Spanish risk to Italian risk
Box 2.1 Economic and financial situation in Turkey  40
 A GDP and contributions to GDP growth
 B External position
 C Turkey: Policy interest rates
 D Turkey: Inflation and exchange rates
Box 2.2 Recent developments in consumer credit  45
 A Changes in the components of consumer credit
 B Breakdown of NPL ratio of credit for purchase of consumer durables
 C Breakdown of NPL ratio of credit for purchase of other goods and services
 D NPL ratio of the components of consumer credit
 E Year-on-year rate of change of the components of consumer credit
 F Year-on-year rate of change of NPLs of the components of consumer credit
 G Year-on-year rate of change of consumer credit in the main Euro area countries
 H New loan interest rates in the main Euro area countries
Box 2.3 New real estate market firms: SOCIMIs  52
 A New IPOs in Spain
 B Leverage and CAPEx of SOCIMIs and other listed sectors
Box 2.4 MREL (Minimum Requirement for own funds and Eligible Liabilities)  71 
Box 3.1 Analytical models for the evaluation of cyclical systemic risk  84
 A Estimates of credit imbalances in Spain. Analytical models and Basel gap

BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2018
OVERVIEW
Since the publication of the previous Financial Stability Report (FSR), risks have clearly 
increased. In particular, several factors might lead to a sharp re-evaluation of risk premia, 
prompting an additional tightening in financial conditions. Such factors include most 
notably: the heightening of trade tensions; the normalisation of US monetary policy; the 
increase in political and economic uncertainty in Italy; the lack of agreement on a negotiated 
exit for the United Kingdom from the European Union; and a continued appreciation of the 
dollar and the euro against the emerging countries’ currencies, which would make these 
countries’ economies more vulnerable. 
Notwithstanding, the Spanish economy has held on its expansionary path, though with 
growth showing a tendency to decelerate. Indeed, the forecasts for such growth (published 
in late September) have been revised slightly downwards, meaning that the rate of 
expansion of activity in terms of GDP growth currently stands at 2.6% for 2018, 2.2% in 
2019 and 2% in 2020. The Spanish unemployment rate has continued falling (14.6% in the 
third quarter of 2018), although the downward trend has eased somewhat in recent 
quarters. The financial position of households and non-financial corporations has 
continued to improve and their debt levels to decline. 
Nonetheless, given the predominance of short-term and/or variable-rate financing, this 
situation might worsen should a scenario of tightening financial conditions that were not 
accompanied by an improvement in the income of households and non-financial 
corporations materialise. Moreover, the debt levels of general government and of the 
economy as a whole vis-à-vis the external sector remain very high, which raises the Spanish 
economy’s vulnerability to adverse future developments in activity or in financing conditions.
In the first half of 2018 Spanish deposit institutions maintained the trend evidenced in the 
previous quarters. Compared with the first six months of 2017, consolidated income grew 
by 12.5% to stand at over €10 billion. The main determinant of this improvement was the 
continuing reduction in asset impairment losses, since the top half of the income statement 
continues to be influenced by narrow margins, in a setting of low interest rates. Activity, for 
its part, continues to decline, meaning that total consolidated assets fell slightly, standing 
0.5% down on their June 2017 level. Credit to the resident private sector in Spain continues 
to contract (–2.9% compared with June 2017), affected by the fall in the volume of non-
performing loans (NPLs), down 26.7% on June 2017. From their late-2013 peak, NPLs 
have fallen by over €114 billion, a decline of somewhat more than 60% since then, with an 
NPL ratio as at June 2018 of 6.4%, 7.5 percentage points, pp, down on its peak.
In strong contrast to the sluggish credit activity in aggregate terms, some segments of the 
business have grown strongly, as is the case of consumer credit for durable goods 
purchases. While the year-on-year growth rate of this type of credit (23% in June 2018 
against 28% in March 2018 and 27% in December 2017) has slowed down somewhat, 
NPLs have quickened substantially (year-on-year growth of 22.6% in June this year).
In terms of solvency, the Common Equity Tier 1, CET1, ratio stood at the same level as in 
June the previous year, namely 11.9%. In this respect, the stress test by the European 
Banking Authority (EBA) and the in-house forward-looking assessment by the Banco de 
España show the considerable resilience of Spanish deposit institutions to a potential 
1 Key developments
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adverse macroeconomic scenario. Although the capital ratio stands clearly above the 
regulatory minimum level, international solvency comparisons, both with the Banking 
Union countries and with the rest of the EU members, reveal that Spanish banks’ capital 
ratios are low. This largely reflects the clean-up of bank balance sheets undertaken and the 
greater density of their assets (measured as the ratio of risk-weighted assets to total 
exposure). In any event, since 2014, when the higher-quality CET1 requirements came into 
force, Spanish banks have only increased this ratio by 30 basis points, bp. The need for 
Spanish institutions to adopt capital-strengthening strategies is therefore evident. 
The main factors of risk to the stability of the Spanish financial system are identified below.
These factors of risk evidence a high degree of interrelatedness, meaning that the 
materialisation of one may prompt the activation of another. 
 Low interest rates and the developments in activity continue to influence Spanish deposit 
institutions’ net interest margins, particularly in domestic business. The significant 
improvement in recorded impairment losses is what has enabled banks to continue 
increasing final income on their profit and loss accounts. This increase provides for the 
strengthening of their solvency levels so that these may draw closer to those of other euro 
area countries’ institutions (Chart A). 
In addition to improving the relative position in terms of capital, the increase in the CET1 
ratio is expected to contribute to compliance with the minimum requirement for own funds 
and eligible liabilities (MREL), which Spanish banks will have progressively to meet in the 
coming years. 
In addition, partly as a result of developments in the demand for credit and of the search 
for more profitable business segments, there has been high-growth in consumer credit for 
durable goods purchases (Chart B). Very fast growth in credit usually entails a greater risk, 
although such risk takes some time to emerge. Indeed, NPL levels have recently increased, 
which will require banks to set aside additional provisioning accordingly, to review the 
sustainability of the pace of their growth in this business segment and to determine 
whether lending standards for new business are in line with the medium-term risk profile 
they desire for their credit portfolio. 
2  Risk factors
2.1  COMPRESSION OF 
MARGINS IN THE INCOME 
STATEMENT ENCOURAGING 
RISK-TAKING 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The colour scheme in the table should be understood as follows: green denotes an absence of risk, yellow indicates low risk, orange, medium risk, and red, high 
risk. The time horizon for which these risks are defined is set by the FSR's frequency, i.e. half-yearly. The arrows indicates whether risk has recently increased, held 
stable or diminished.
1
Compression of the deposit institutions' business margin in an environment of low interest rates, 
which increases the propensity to seek more profitable and riskier business alternatives.
2
Possible increase in economic and geopolitical uncertainty and/or stepping up of trade tensions that 
may lead to a tightening of financial conditions at the international level in the form of risk premium 
repricing, impacting the value of financial assets and the sustainability of economic agents' debt.
3
Subsequent deterioration in the emerging markets' economic and financial situation with a potential 
impact on the results of those financial institutions most exposed in these markets.
RISK FACTORS (a) TABLE 1
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The high degree of economic and political uncertainty and the upsurge in trade tensions 
pose a risk in terms of a potential worsening in financial conditions at the international level. 
The economic and fiscal situation in Italy, with no direct repercussions on the Spanish 
economy, so far, a further escalation of protectionist measures and a greater-than-expected 
hike in interest rates in the United States may prompt a greater tightening of financing 
conditions internationally with an ultimate impact on the financial position of households 
and firms and on sovereign debt, subsequently impacting banks adversely. Rising 
uncertainty in the past months has led to a negative market assessment with the subsequent 
correction in stock market prices (Chart C), and an increase in the cost of funding via 
increases in risk premia (Chart D). Additionally, within the European context, there is no 
clarity as to what the final outcome of the current Brexit negotiations may be. Exit by the UK 
from the European Union without an agreement could have an adverse economic impact on 
this country and, ultimately, on the firms located there, with potential consequences for the 
continuity of certain financial contracts. Compounding the foregoing domestically is the 
uncertainty over the future economic policy stance against the background of Spain’s 
fragmented parliament and any potential rise in political tensions in Catalonia. 
A heightening of the political and economic risks affecting the emerging economies in 
the current environment of slowing world trade caused by the protectionist tensions 
created, with a rather unfavourable scenario in terms of exchange rates and capital flows 
(Charts E and F), might directly affect the level of activity of the emerging countries and 
2.2  ECONOMIC UNCERTAINTY, 
GEOPOLITICS AND TRADE 
TENSIONS
2.3  WORSENING OF THE 
EMERGING MARKETS’ 
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL 
SITUATION 
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
Jun-15 Dec-15 Jun-16 Dec-16 Jun-17 Dec-17 Jun-18
CREDIT NPLs
B  YEAR-ON-YEAR RATE OF CHANGE IN CREDIT FOR PURCHASE OF CONSUMER
DURABLES AND IN THE RELATED NPLs
Deposit institutions
%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
EE LV LU FI LT IE SI MT BE NL GR DE SK GB AT FR IT CY PT ES
EU AVERAGE
A  CET1 RATIO. EUROPEAN COMPARISON.
SSM COUNTRIES AND UNITED KINGDOM
June 2018
%
SOURCES: Banco de España and EBA.
SOURCE: Datastream.
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18
SPAIN ITALY FRANCE
GERMANY EURO AREA EUROPE
01.01.2018 = 100
C  BANKING-SECTOR STOCK MARKET INDICES
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
200
220
Jan-17 Apr-17 Jul-17 Oct-17 Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18
SPAIN  ITALY EURO AREA UNITED STATES
D  PREMIA ON 5-YEAR BANK CDS
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 20 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2018
ultimately result in a worsening of the financing conditions of banks engaging in activity 
in those countries.
Since the previous FSR, Turkey and Argentina, two countries with a high level of external 
financial dependency, have seen some of these risks materialise. That said, their 
idiosyncratic problems do not appear so far to have spread to other, bigger emerging 
economies to which the Spanish banking system is exposed. 
Broadly, the risk to the generation of banking income may be said to have held stable 
against a background of economic activity that is still positive overall. Meanwhile, the 
other two risks (asset re-pricing and developments in the emerging economies) have 
recently increased, given the existing trade tensions and the economic and geopolitical 
uncertainty. 
As usual, the risks discussed above are addressed in greater detail throughout this 
Report. It is sought to show their interrelatedness and impact on the financial system, in 
particular on the banking system, and their potential repercussion on credit risk, the 
most significant risk for Spanish deposit institutions, their income statement and their 
solvency position. 
Chapter 3 describes the macroprudential policy stance of the Banco de España in recent 
months. Along with the description and analysis of the systemic risks map and the 
macroprudential policy decisions taken on the basis of the main indicators used, this 
chapter presents some alternative models for assessing cyclical systemic risk (Box 3.1). 
These models could be used as a complement for informing decisions on the level of the 
countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB), which at present is guided by the credit-to-GDP 
gap and which evidences certain methodological issues that are accentuated in countries 
that have recently experienced a very pronounced credit cycle, as is Spain’s case. 
3  Macroprudential 
analysis and policy
SOURCE: IIF.
a Depreciation from 1 April to 10 September 2018.
b Current account balance as a percentage of GDP in 2018 Q1.
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1 MACROECONOMIC RISKS AND FINANCIAL MARKETS
Since the previous FSR published in May 2018, some tightening of global financial 
conditions has been witnessed, this being of greater intensity in the emerging market 
economies (EMEs). These developments have mainly been influenced by the normalisation 
of US monetary policy and by the resurgence of trade tensions. In Europe, other factors 
negatively impacting financial conditions have been the political uncertainty in Italy and 
the lack of headway in Brexit negotiations (Chart 1.1.A). Until the end of September, US 
stock market prices held up favourably despite the slight intensification of the ongoing 
monetary policy normalisation and the growing threat of protectionism. Market indices hit 
new highs, led in particular by the technology firms’ share prices. However, in October the 
US stock market indices showed sharp falls and heightened volatility owing to rising long-
term interest rates and worsening business profit projections, which were influenced by 
heightened protectionism. 
US monetary policy normalisation and the expansionary stance of its fiscal policy were 
reflected in a generalised strengthening of the dollar. The US currency appreciated against 
the euro, the yen and sterling, and also against virtually all EME currencies, whose 
depreciations against the dollar were in excess of double figures in Turkey, Argentina and 
Brazil (Chart 1.1.B). US 10-year government bond yields stood above 3% at the cut-off 
date of this Report (Chart 1.1.C). Despite this, the US yield curve continued to flatten, 
something which has occasionally been interpreted as a leading indicator of future 
recessions (see Box 1.1). In any event, corporate debt spreads have held relatively stable, 
and those of riskier corporations are greatly below their historical average (Chart 1.1.D).
Conditions in most EMEs worsened, especially from April, influenced by higher US interest 
rates, the weakening of their currencies against the dollar and growing trade tensions. The 
countries most affected were those with bigger external deficits and greater foreign currency 
funding needs, Argentina and Turkey among them (Chart 1.1.E). In recent months there 
have been two major bouts of volatility: the first was in June following the announcement of 
new US tariffs on Chinese goods; and the second in late July, given the further deterioration 
in the EMEs following the heavy depreciations of the Argentine and Turkish currencies. This 
instability in the EMEs also translated into a brake on net capital inflows (Chart 1.1.F). 
European banks were also negatively affected by the turbulence in the EMEs. Hence, the 
share prices of the European banks most exposed to these countries fell with greater intensity 
from late July to the first week of September, compared with the share prices of those banks 
less exposed (13.5% against 8.1%, Chart 1.1.G). Despite the strong deterioration in the 
Argentine and Turkish economies, the contagion from this turbulence, both to the other 
emerging and developed economies alike, appears to be contained for the moment.
The uncertainty over economic and fiscal policy in Italy had an adverse impact on this country’s 
financial markets, chiefly taking the form of strong rises in general government debt yields 
(see Chart A of Box 1.2) and of notable – albeit more moderate – increases in the case of bank 
bonds (see Chart 1.1.H). These movements have so far had a limited impact on financial 
markets in Spain and in the rest of the euro area countries (see Box 1.2). Another factor of 
uncertainty concerns Brexit. Exit by the UK from the European Union without an agreement 
could have an adverse economic impact on this country and, ultimately, on the firms located 
there, with potential consequences for the continuity of certain financial contracts. 
1.1 Financial markets
Global financial conditions 
have tended to tighten, 
especially in the emerging 
economies under the influence 
of money market normalisation 
in the United States
The deterioration in conditions 
on the emerging markets has 
been particularly marked in 
Argentina and Turkey … 
… which adversely  
impacted the share prices  
of the European banks 
exposed to these economies 
The political uncertainty in 
Italy has prompted a strong 
rise in Italian government debt 
and bank bond yields, without 
spreading to the rest of the 
euro area
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SOURCES: Datastream, JP Morgan and IIF.
a Values higher than 100 denote depreciations of the dollar relative to 1 January 2017.
b Corporate bond spread: "B"-graded Merril Lynch bond versus US 10-year Treasury bond.
c EMBI (Emerging Markets Bond Index) Global and CEMBI (Corporate Emerging Markets Bond Index ) Board Diversified are indices prepared by JP Morgan. The 
EMBI measures the country-risk of the group of emerging countries and represents the spread of the emerging countries' sovereign debt yield in dollars over the 
US sovereign debt yield. CEMBI measures the corporate risk of the group of emerging countries and represents the spread of emperging countries' corporate 
debt yield in dollars over US corporate debt yield.
d Depreciation from 1 April to 10 September 2018.
e Current account balance as a percentage of GDP in 2018 Q1.
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BOX 1.1DETERMINANTS OF THE LOW LEVEL OF THE SLOPE OF THE YIELD CURVE IN THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY
In 2018 to date, a flattening of the yield curve has been observed in 
the United States, whereby the spread between 10-year and one-
year Treasury yields has narrowed to below 100 bp (Chart A). This 
phenomenon has been scrutinised by analysts, since frequently 
economic crises have been preceded by an inversion of the yield 
curve (i.e. when the spread between long-term and short-term 
rates turns negative).1 Indeed, both the 2001 and 2008 crises came 
about following such inversions of the curve. Although the debate 
among experts has been centred on the United States,2 in the euro 
area, too, this spread is narrow, given the area’s current cyclical 
position, especially in the case of the best-rated issuers, such as 
Germany, although it has been relatively stable since 2015.
However, there are differences in how the low levels of the slope of 
the yield curve have been reached in both economic areas. These 
are essentially linked to divergences between the respective 
monetary policies, with a progressive tightening in the former case 
and an accommodative stance in the latter. Thus, in the case of 
the United States, the 10-year rate has been oscillating between 
2% and 3% since mid-2011, with a slight rise over the past year, 
which has drawn rates above 3.1%. The ongoing progressive nor-
malisation of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy has led the 
one-year rate to rise significantly from the levels close to 0% ob-
served in 2014 to over 2% recently (see Chart B). The result of 
long-term interest rates at relatively low levels —given the euro 
area’s current cyclical position — and short-term interest rates on a 
rising trend has led the spread between both to stand below 50 bp 
for the first time since 2007.3
In the euro area, the short-term rate has been at levels close to 
or below zero since 2012 and there has been no rising trend in 
the recent period; unlike the Federal Reserve, the European 
Central Bank has so far maintained a very accommodative mo-
netary policy stance. In Europe’s case, the spread between long 
and short-term rates has been compressed as a result of the 
decline in yields at the long end of the curve. The German ben-
chmark rate, which was already at historically low levels of 
around 2% in 2012 and 2013, fell further as from early 2014, 
coinciding with the stepping up of the expansionary monetary 
policy that led bond yields to figures below 0.5% (see Chart C). 
Further to these developments, the slope of the yield curve in 
Germany is currently, as in the United States, below its historical 
average since 2001.
To analyse the implications of the low level of the yield curve 
slope in the two geographical areas, it is useful to separate long-
term rates into two components. Hence, the 10-year bond yield 
reflects, on one hand, market expectations about the average 
level of short-term rates over the next 10 years; and, on the other, 
a term risk premium that compensates its holders for the risk of 
holding until maturity a security whose market value is subject to 
the changes that may occur in interest rates. As these two varia-
bles are not observable, an estimate must be made. This Box 
presents the results of this breakdown based on an extension of 
a standard approach in which expectations are allowed to chan-
ge over time.4
Chart D shows the results of the estimates for the United States and 
Germany. As can be seen, term risk premia have fallen considerably 
in the past two decades in both economies, standing at present at 
low figures in historical terms. The pattern is parallel in Germany 
and the United States in much of the sample. The main divergences 
are from end-2013, when the Federal Reserve announced the start 
of its tapering of asset purchases, and the ECB embarked on a new 
phase of its expansionary monetary policy (TLTRO and APP), which 
would mark the beginning of the monetary policy divergences 
between the two areas. At present, it is estimated the level of the term 
risk premium will be close to zero in Germany and around 120 bp 
in the United States, further removed from its historical average in the 
former case than in the latter.
1  Estrella, A., and F. Mishkin (1997), «The predictive power of the term 
structure of interest rates in Europe and United States: implications for the 
European Central Bank», European Economic Review, 41, 1375-1401.
2  These developments in the United States have led to a debate between 
economists and members of the Federal Reserve about the possible 
inversion of the curve. Thus, for example, Neel Kashkari, president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, pointed out in July that the 
Federal Reserve should not continue raising the benchmark interest rate 
so as to prevent a possible inversion of the curve. J. Bullard, president 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, had positioned himself along 
these same lines late last year (www.stlouisfed.org/~/media/Files/PDFs/
Bullard/remarks/2017/Bullard_Little_Rock_AR_1_December_2017.pdf). 
However, Ben Bernanke warned about the danger of erroneously inter-
preting the inversion of the curve, since according to his judgement, this 
would not be related to the future course of monetary policy 
(www.ft.com/content/e72fdf28-8a1c-11e8-bf9e-8771d5404543). The 
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Jay Powell, stated that monetary po-
licy would not be altered on the basis of the slope of the yield curve, and 
that what was really relevant was the information that may be obtained 
from it about the long-term neutral rate of interest.
3  See “The flattening of the yield curve in the United States», Analytical 
Articles, Banco de España, March 2018. https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/
SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/InformesBoletinesRevistas/ArticulosAna-
liticos/2018/T1/Files/beaa1801-art6e.pdf. 
4  In the academic literature, the usual approach for this separation is ba-
sed on a dynamic equation of the factors comprising the yield curve in 
order to obtain interest-rate expectations, and on an associated risk 
price equation, that enables term risk premia to be derived. One of the 
main problems with these models is that the standard dynamic equa-
tions usually lead to expectations that are lacking in credibility, since 
they scarcely change over time. To avoid this, this Box uses an ap-
proach which provides for some persistence over time in respect of 
expectations, similar to that in the approach by Abbritti, M., Gil-Alana, 
L.A., Lovcha, Y. and Moreno, A. (2015). «Term structure persistence». 
Journal of Financial Econometrics, 14(2), 331-352. For this breakdown, 
expectations are obtained from an ARFIMA model on the yield term 
components (long-term level and slope). These models, which are a 
generalisation of the more usual ARIMA models in the literature, are 
characterised by their possessing great persistence, or «long memory», 
evidencing an autocorrelation function that declines more slowly than 
«short memory» processes such as the ARIMA. That allows expecta-
tions to change over time, something which is very difficult to capture 
with the usual models.
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Regarding the second component (long-term interest rate expec-
tations), in both areas the estimated values also show that cu-
rrently values are low in light of the cyclical position of these eco-
nomies, which is compatible with the literature on the low natural 
rate of interest that would be linked to the low potential growth of 
the advanced economies.5 In the case of the United States, despi-
te the fact that the rate hikes by the Federal Reserve have raised 
in the past two years these expectations to above their historical 
SOURCES: Bundesbank, Federal Reserve and Banco de España.
a The dotted lines represent the averages of the respective time series for the period shown in the chart. The interest rates shown are the zero-coupon rates for 
each term estimated by the Bundesbank and the Federal Reserve, respectively.
b Risk premia are obtained from a decomposition of 10-year interest rates into term risk premia and expectations about short-term interest rates. Expectations 
are obtained by predicting the instantaneous short-term interest rates using an ARFIMA model on each of the components of the yield curve (long-term level, 
slope and curvature) estimated daily. Once the short-term rate expectations are obtained, the premia can be had taking the difference between 10-year rates 
and short rate expectations.
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5  See G. Fiorentini, A. Galesi, G. Pérez-Quirós and E. Sentana (2018) «The 
rise and fall of the natural interest rate». Banco de España Working 
Paper no. 1822.
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average, such expectations were currently below that benchmark 
rate (Chart E). In Germany, these expectations have continued fa-
lling in the recent period, according to these estimates, reaching 
levels considerably below the historical average (Chart F).
To conclude, what this breakdown of 10-year rates would be indi-
cating is that both term risk premia and long-term interest rate ex-
pectations are at historically low levels, especially in the euro area. 
In both cases, this might have implications for financial stability. 
Hence, long-term rates in these economies might rise if, first, there 
were a normalisation of term risk premia, associated with risk re-
pricing by agents or unexpected changes in the portfolios of cen-
tral banks (which are one of their main holders), which would lead 
term risk premia to rise to levels more similar to those observed in 
the past; or if current expectations about the future course of short-
term rates were to be revised upwards. This rise might have conse-
quences, owing to the negative impact on investor portfolios and 
on agents’ financing conditions and investment decisions (for 
which long-term rates are a very significant factor).
In the monetary policy arena, the September ECB Governing Council confirmed the June 
announcement on the finalisation, at the end of this year, of the asset purchase 
programme (APP), provided that the medium-term inflation outlook holds. In particular, it 
decided to reduce in October the monthly pace of net asset purchases from the current 
level of €30 billion per month to €15 billion, with this pace being maintained until 
December 2018 to then cease in January 2019. The Council stipulated, moreover, that 
once net purchases have concluded, it will continue reinvesting the ensuing maturities in 
its APP portfolio over a prolonged period of time after the net asset purchases finalise 
and, in any event, for as long as proves necessary to maintain favourable liquidity 
conditions and a broad degree of monetary accommodation. Further, the Council did not 
expect short-term changes in policy interest rates, which would hold at current levels 
until at least the summer of 2019. 
Neither the ECB’s announcements nor the continuation of the monetary policy normalisation 
process by the US Federal Reserve have had significant effects on US and euro area 
financial markets, in a setting in which both term premia and expected long-term interest 
rates are holding at historically low levels (see Box 1.1). Against this background, rises in 
long-term yields both in the United States and the euro area cannot be ruled out; these 
could be triggered either as a result of a normalisation of term risk premia or of unexpected 
changes in monetary policies, although this latter scenario seems less likely given central 
banks’ communication policies. Under any of these scenarios the rise in the cost of 
financing for private issuers might be even more marked given the low level of credit 
premia. Moreover, credit risk premia might rise if certain short-term risks materialise, such 
as an escalation in trade tensions, a more marked downturn in EMEs or specific political 
or geopolitical risks. The materialisation of any of these risks might also adversely affect 
financial and non-financial institutions’ share prices either through their impact on the 
discount factor or through the rise in stock market risk premia. 
Financial conditions in the EMEs might worsen as a result of a fresh escalation in 
protectionist measures or of greater than expected rises in US interest rates. Although 
these economies as a whole appear less vulnerable than in the past, some have built up 
certain risks in recent years, in particular on account of greater external indebtedness by 
their non-financial private sectors. 
The ECB announced  
the end of the asset  
purchase programme  
for December 2018 
The materialisation  
of certain risks might translate 
into a significant tightening  
in global financial conditions 
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The general elections in Italy on 4 March led to a fragmented 
parliament in which the political parties critical of the European 
Union (EU) and, in particular, of Economic and Monetary Union, 
increased their share of the vote. This resulted in a period of 
instability on the Italian financial markets as from mid-May, when 
the complex post-electoral negotiations culminated in a 
government pact between the Northern League and the Five-Star 
Movement. The agreed government programme entailed, among 
other elements, fiscal expansion plans1 difficult to square with the 
commitments undertaken under the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), although the campaign promises most clearly at odds with 
the basic tenets of the European project were sidestepped. 
In August, the start of the 2019 budget negotiations confirmed the 
complexity of the Italian political landscape. The doubts over the 
country’s fiscal outlook prompted a fresh bout of financial 
instability, which flared again in October following the confirmation 
that the draft budget does not observe the limits of the SGP and 
poses a new political and economic challenge for the European 
Union. The budget submitted to the EC includes a public deficit of 
2.4% for 2019 – against 0.8% in the April Stability Programme – 
and deviates notably from the Council’s July 2018 recommendations 
regarding the adjustment of the structural budgetary balance.2 
Moreover, the foreseeable macroeconomic scenario, which 
includes a 1.5% increase in GDP in 2019, does not have the 
backing of the Italian independent fiscal council and is considered 
optimistic, which also adds a risk in respect of the path of reduction 
for public debt, which is currently at a very high level of 130% of 
SOURCES: ECB, Thomson Reuters and Banco de España.
a NCA and NCL denote the net change in assets and the net change in liabilities, respectively. The portfolio investment account in net terms is calculated as assets 
minus liabilities, such that a positive (negative) sign entails a net outflow (inflow) of funds.
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1  The central elements of this expansion were the reduction in income tax 
and the introduction of a minimum income. The agreement also 
envisaged a reduction in contributions to the European budget and the 
reversal of the 2011 pension system reforms. This fiscal expansion will 
be funded in part by the issuance of the so-called mini-BOTS, small-
denomination securities that could subsequently be used in other 
transactions and that could be the embryo for a parallel currency.
2  The measures include a minimum income scheme (somewhat less 
generous than initially planned), a reduction in income tax and 
backtracking on the recent pension reform, facilitating early retirement.
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BOX 1.2THE POLITICAL AND FISCAL UNCERTAINTY IN ITALY AND THE REPERCUSSIONS ON FINANCIAL MARKETS (cont´d.)
GDP. Given these circumstances and for the first time ever in the 
history of the EU, the EC rejected the Italian budget and requested 
that a new draft budget be submitted within three weeks.
With perspective, the events in recent months illustrate the interaction 
between increased political uncertainty, on one hand, and, on the 
other, the fundamental vulnerabilities of the Italian economy (low 
economic growth and high public debt). Investors’ perception of 
higher risk has been reflected in a worsening in financial conditions 
which private and public agents alike must face. 
In the case of public debt, there has been an increase in volatility 
and a marked decline in prices. The 10-year interest rate on Italian 
debt, which had held relatively stable at around 2% since the start 
of the year, began to climb in mid-May, exceeding 3% at the end 
of that month and again in August. The recent rebound has taken 
it to a high of 3.7% on 19 October, entailing a spread over the 
German Bund of over 300 bp, the highest level since mid-June 
2013. The response by short-term interest rates has also been 
sharp. The yield on two-year debt, which started from negative 
figures, rose to over 2% in late May and 1.4% in August. With the 
latest tensions it has climbed once more to a level of close to 2% 
(see Chart A). The perception of greater credit risk on the sovereign 
debt has also entailed a downgrade (by a notch to Baa3 on the 
part of Moody’s) and the emergence of a country-risk component 
in financing costs for the other agents in the economy, especially 
those whose activity is concentrated in Italy. 
The context of greater perceived risk has also given rise to capital 
outflows, mainly through sales of public debt securities. As Chart B 
shows, the Italian economy has since 2015 seen net capital out-
flows in securities transactions. These flows were the outcome of 
investments in foreign assets by Italian sectors, and of Italian pu-
blic debt securities sales by non-residents within the framework of 
the ECB’s public securities purchase programme (PSPP). However, 
the instability following the elections saw capital outflows step up 
over the most recent period through non-residents’ sales of Italian 
securities, especially public debt instruments, which amounted to 
€24.8 billion and €33 billion in May and June, respectively. 
These movements were offset by net domestic public debt purcha-
ses by Italian banks totalling more than €47 billion between May and 
September, proving particularly high in May (€28 billion) and in June 
(€14 billion). As illustrated in Chart C, banks interrupted the tenden-
cy towards the divestment of domestic public debt holdings. The 
value of this portfolio amounted to around €380 billion in Septem-
ber. According to the information on Italian public debt holders, Ita-
lian bank holdings accounted for 19.7% of outstanding public debt 
securities in July3, compared with 17.4% in April. 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The contagion measure reflects the sensitivity of one sector's risk to more extreme negative events of the other sector in the same country, and it entails an extension 
of the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) concept. Hence, the measure of the Italian banking sector's sensitivity to what occurs in the Italian sovereign is defined as 
a ratio. The numerator is the average daily change in Italian banks' CDS index (in basis points) on the days on which the biggest increases in the Italian sovereign 
CDS premium take place during the business days of the related period of time (those on which the change in the sovereign CDS is above the 90th percentile of the 
distribution of the daily change in the latter for that period). And the denominator is the average of the daily change in the sovereign CDS premium on those same 
days. The contagion measure is calculated for the recent period of turbulence in Italy (May 2018 - October 2018) and also for the sovereign debt crisis period (May 
2010 - June 2012). In Chart E, the first two sets of bars show the sensitivity of the premium of Italian and Spanish bank CDS to these countries' sovereign CDS. The 
third and fourth set of bars refer to the sensitivity of the Italian and Spanish sovereign CDS premia, respectively, to these countries' banking sector. The contagion 
measure is relative to risk developments in the starting sector (denominator), whereby values close to one indicate that changes in the premia of the two sectors are 
on a similar scale. Values that are positive but close to zero indicate that the CDS premia move in the same direction, but the increase in the premia of the starting 
sector (denominator) is far higher than that of the exposed sector (numerator).
b The contagion measure is based on the sensitivity of Spain's sovereign and bank risk to the more extreme negative events of the same sectors in Italy. The 
contagion measures in this chart are a variation on the sensitivity measures in Chart E.
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3  In relation to other holders, in July 33.8% of outstanding Italian public 
debt securities were in the hands of non-residents (36.9% in April), 
19.3% on the central bank balance sheet (19.1% in April), 22.6% in the 
hands of non-bank financial institutions (21.6% in April) and 4.6% were 
held by the non-financial resident sector (4.9% in April).
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The turbulence on sovereign debt markets likewise had 
repercussions for Italian banks, which were also affected by the 
materialisation of risks in certain emerging economies, thereby 
reinforcing the link between sovereign and bank risk. As Chart 
1.1.H in the main text illustrates, Italian banks saw the risk premium 
on their bonds increase, along with a significant correction in their 
stock market prices, chiefly during the second half of May. Chart E 
shows the degree of interaction between sovereign and bank risks 
between Italy and Spain for the recent period of turbulence and 
compares it with that observed during the euro area sovereign 
debt crisis period. There is thus a high degree of sensitivity4 of 
Italian banks’ CDS premia to the most negative sovereign-related 
events in that country since late May 2018, and such premia stand 
far above the values relating to the sovereign debt crisis. Moreover, 
the level is close to 1, suggesting that the changes in the bank 
CDS premium are on a similar scale to those in the sovereign CDS 
premium. This effect is bidirectional in Italy’s case, since a high 
sensitivity of sovereign CDS premia to a worsening in bank CDS is 
also detected, although the intensity appears to be less and is at a 
level close to that observed during the sovereign debt crisis. 
However, the interaction between bank and sovereign risk in Spain 
has remained low, appreciably below what was seen in the 
sovereign debt crisis.
The tensions in financial conditions in Italy have, so far, had limited 
repercussions on the markets of other euro area countries, as 
evidenced by the moderate increase in other sovereign bond 
yields. Spanish and Portuguese 10-year government bond yields 
rose in late May to 1.6% and 2.2%, respectively, levels that have 
once more been reached (exceeded in the Spanish case) during 
the renewed tensions in October and which are 20-30 bp up on the 
level prior to the Italian elections (see Chart D). Chart F offers the 
same message, showing the sensitivity of the indicators of Spanish 
sovereign and bank risk to changes in the same risk indicators in 
Italy. The degree of sensitivity of Spanish sovereign CDS premia to 
changes in the related premia in Italy has thus been relatively low 
during the recent period of turbulence on the Italian sovereign debt 
market and far below the levels observed during the sovereign debt 
crisis in the euro area. The sensitivity of Spanish bank CDS to the 
changes in bank risk in Italy has been somewhat higher but also 
lower than that witnessed during the sovereign debt crisis. 
In sum, the sensitivity of Italian financial markets to the increased 
political uncertainty as from May reveals once more that high debt 
levels against a background of low economic growth are a notable 
source of vulnerability. Italy is the third euro area economy in terms 
of GDP size, and although the signs of transmission to other euro 
area economies, including Spain, have been limited so far, it 
cannot be ruled out that further bouts of political uncertainty or 
uncertainty over the Italian fiscal situation might have more 
significant adverse effects in the future, especially in the current 
setting of economic deceleration and heightening global risks. 
4 See the footnote to Chart E for a detailed description of the indicator.
On the developed economies’ markets, this adjustment in financing conditions would 
affect the more indebted segments more, as is the case with certain companies with a low 
credit rating or with public-sector corporations in some countries. Funding conditions for 
the European banks most exposed to the EMEs might be particularly affected by any 
future worsening in these economies. More generally, funding conditions for the European 
banking sector might also worsen as a result of a potential increase in political uncertainty 
in Italy or of a lack of agreement on Brexit. 
After some weakness in economic activity in 2018 Q1, the following quarter saw a 
sounder expansion in the global economy, although it was less balanced owing to the 
diverging paths of the advanced and emerging economies (Charts 1.2.A and 1.2.B). 
Specifically, growth in the advanced economies as a whole remained robust, especially 
in the United States, where GDP expanded at an annualised quarterly rate of 4.2%, 
underpinned by the fiscal expansion and the soundness of private demand. In Japan 
and the United Kingdom activity quickened, while in the euro area it remained less 
dynamic than in 2017. In the emerging economies, activity in Q2 turned generally less 
favourable as net capital outflows, currency depreciations and tighter financial conditions 
all materialised, bearing down on the countries considered most vulnerable (such as 
Argentina and Turkey). In Asia, Chinese GDP growth eased slightly to 6.7% year-on year, 
owing partly to the escalation of the trade war with the United States. In Latin America, 
1.2  The macroeconomic 
environment 
1.2.1  THE MACROECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENT OUTSIDE 
THE EURO AREA 
Growth in the global economy 
might have peaked in the 
summer months...
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GDP contracted in Argentina and Mexico, although in the latter economy this appears to 
be somewhat more transitory.
The latest indicators show that trade tensions and the tightening financial conditions in 
some emerging economies have started to adversely affect global activity (Chart 1.2.C) 
and especially trade (Chart 1.2.D). Accordingly, a progressive slowdown in activity is 
foreseeable until it converges on a potential growth path lower than that before the crisis. 
SOURCES: Datastream, IHS Markit, CPB and JP Morgan.
a JP Morgan EMCI index.
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The risks to the baseline scenario are tilted to the downside, owing to a possibly sharper 
than expected tightening in financial conditions and a heightening of trade tensions. 
Further, these risks might be interrelated, with some triggering others. For example, the 
normalisation of US monetary policy (Chart 1.2.E) and the subsequent exchange rate 
appreciation might worsen the current account balance, which is precisely what President 
Trump is seeking to correct with his tariff-raising policy (Chart 1.2.F). Likewise, the 
uncertainty associated with the trade tensions might increase risk premia, tightening 
financial conditions. 
The bout of turbulence in the EMEs last summer was the most negative episode seen 
since May 2013 in terms of currency depreciations and stock market declines (Chart 
1.3.A), but not of net capital outflows (Chart 1.3.B). As earlier stated, the markets have 
discriminated among the emerging economies depending on their vulnerabilities. In this 
respect, the case of Mexico is significant, as its currency appreciated against the dollar 
as from mid-June following the favourable prospects of a new trade agreement being 
signed with the United States in place of NAFTA (Chart 1.3.C), although it depreciated 
towards the end of the reporting period following the halting of work on the capital’s air 
transport infrastructure. In the case of other emerging economies, the authorities have 
reacted to this new environment. Some central banks, mainly in Asia (the Philippines, 
Indonesia and India) but also in the Czech Republic and Chile, raised their policy interest 
rates to some extent; others, such as Hong Kong, intervened on the foreign exchange 
... with downside risks 
associated with the tightening 
financial conditions and with 
the increase in trade tensions
The emerging economies are 
facing a tightening of financial 
conditions, albeit with some 
differentiation depending on 
idiosyncratic factors
SOURCES: Datastream and Global Market Monitor (IMF).
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markets (Chart 1.3.D). Also, the Turkish government unveiled a Medium-Term Economic 
Programme (for the period 2019-2021) containing some restrictive fiscal measures. 
In the opposite direction, the Chinese authorities eased financial conditions (lowering 
reserve requirements and injecting liquidity), they reintroduced the countercyclical factor 
to temper exchange rate oscillations and they raised the cost of holding short foreign 
currency positions so as to combat the depreciation of the Chinese currency. 
Notwithstanding, trade tensions with the United States are making themselves felt in the 
form of a diminished dynamism of activity. For this reason, the authorities have also 
announced some fiscal expansion plans. Specifically, corporate and income taxes have 
been cut, and local governments have been advised to accelerate the issuance of special 
bonds to guarantee the funding of investment spending on infrastructure. That might 
check the ongoing correction of imbalances and the transition to a new growth model 
which the Chinese authorities had considered to be a priority. 
The position of other large emerging economies of material importance to the Spanish 
financial system is mixed. The Brazilian economy, for instance, continued to recover, 
albeit at a very slow rate, owing both to the aforementioned external reasons and to 
domestic factors. In this respect, inflation appears to be under control and the external 
account is balanced; however, the budget deficit has not been cut and remains at 7% of 
GDP, meaning that public debt may exceed 75% of GDP at the end of the year. Against 
this background, the markets seem to have reacted with normality to the outcome of the 
elections, which addeduncertainty to the baseline scenario. In the case of Mexico, the 
economy shrank in Q2, but owing to temporary factors. The agreement in principle of a 
new trade treaty with the United States in place of NAFTA is removing much of the 
uncertainty and external pressure to which the Mexican economy had been subject.
Lastly, in the case of the emerging economies of relevance to Spain that have been most 
affected by the market turbulence, Turkey had been overheating to some extent since 
2017, which translated into high inflation and a swollen external deficit, which required 
major foreign-currency financing flows (see Box 2.1). Against this background, the lack 
of confidence in the Turkish authorities regarding their readiness to apply appropriate 
economic policies was compounded, in early August, by the escalation of political 
tensions with the United States, resulting in a heavy depreciation of the Turkish lira and 
a weakening of financial indicators. Faced with this situation, the central bank and the 
banking supervision agency adopted a series of measures to provide liquidity to the 
banking system, raising their benchmark rate by 6.25 pp in September (Chart 1.3.D). 
From mid-September, the easing of tensions with the USA made for more stable financial 
conditions in the country, which even allowed the authorities to obtain loans on the 
international markets. 
In Argentina’s case, it is highly likely that the markets have penalised the combination of a 
relatively very lax fiscal adjustment with meagre progress in combating inflation. The 
upshot was strong capital outflows and a depreciation of the peso that led to intervention 
on the foreign exchange markets, a rise in policy interest rates and, finally, a request to the 
IMF for assistance. Insofar as the peso continued to depreciate, the authorities adopted 
an even more restrictive bias and renegotiated the extension and bringing forward of the 
funds foreseen in the agreement. The bias duly materialised: in monetary terms (initially 
increasing the policy interest rate to 60%, Chart 1.3.D, and subsequently suspending the 
inflation-targeting monetary policy, as it had lost its validity as a nominal anchor, switching 
temporarily to a monetary policy based on ceilings on monetary base growth), in fiscal 
Turkey and Argentina have 
had to adopt highly restrictive 
measures to address financial 
market turbulence 
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terms (announcing stricter targets than those included in the agreement with the IMF for 
2019 – a balanced budget – and 2020 – a primary surplus of 1% of GDP –) and in exchange 
rate terms (central bank interventions would be restricted to a limited amount and only on 
occasions where the exchange rate lay outside broad bands around a central exchange 
rate with a daily adjustment on a pre-established path).
In 2018 to date, economic activity has slowed in the euro area, leading quarter-on-
quarter GDP growth to fall to 0.2% in the third quarter of the year, against 0.7% in 2017 
Q4 (Chart 1.4.A). Some of the factors behind this slowdown are purely transitory, but 
other more permanent factors, such as the lagged effects on foreign trade flows arising 
from the appreciation of the euro during 2017 the worsening situation of the emerging 
economies and the possible impact of the geopolitical tensions and uncertainty over 
protectionist policies shape a more unfavourable scenario. Against this background, in 
September the ECB revised its growth forecasts, taking that for the current year 
downwards to 2%, and those for 2019 and 2020 to 1.8% and 1.7%, respectively, i.e. 0.1 
pp less in 2018 and 2019 compared with the previous forecasting exercise. 
This lesser momentum of activity in the recent period has not prevented the year-on-
year growth rate of the HICP from increasing in recent months to 2.1% in September, 
although its path continues to be highly influenced by the more volatile components (in 
particular by the recent upward trajectory of oil prices). The core inflation measure, 
which excludes the least stable items (energy and unprocessed food), continued to 
hover around 1.2% (1.1% in September). However, despite a rise in energy prices, the 
1.2.2  THE MACROECONOMIC 
SETTING IN THE EURO 
AREA AND IN SPAIN
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appreciation of the euro in the first half of the year led the ECB to maintain its forecasts 
for the annual inflation rate at 1.7% for each of the three years of the forecasting horizon 
(Chart 1.4.C). 
In 2018 to date, the Spanish economy has continued to move on an expansionary course, 
posting higher growth rates than those of the main euro area economies. That said, the 
quarter-on-quarter increase in GDP in Q2 and Q3 was somewhat more moderate than in 
the preceding quarters, at 0.6% (2.7% and 2.5% year-on-year respectively). The latest 
Banco de España projections, published in late September, envisage a continuation of the 
easing growth trend which would place the rate of expansion at 2.6%, 2.2% and 2% in 
2018, 2019 and 2020, respectively, entailing a downward revision of 0.1, 0.2 and 0.1 pp 
compared with the June projections1 (see Chart 1.4.B). These developments would come 
about against a background in which a gradual slowdown in foreign markets, a progressively 
lesser impact of monetary policy on agents’ financing conditions and a gradual rise in the 
household saving rate from its current low levels are expected. 
1 For further details see “Quarterly report on the Spanish economy”, Economic Bulletin 3/2018, Banco de España.
Spanish GDP continued to 
grow at a high though 
somewhat more moderate 
rate, a slowdown that is 
forecast to continue in the 
coming quarters
SOURCES: INE, Idealista and Banco de España.
a Maximum and minimum prices by region.
b As published in Idealista.
c The GDP series is seasonally adjusted.
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Turning to prices, following the rise in the year-on-year rate of change of the CPI in the 
first half of the year (prompted by energy and, to a lesser extent, unprocessed food 
prices), this rate remained relatively steady, standing at 2.3% in September. In the coming 
quarters inflation is forecast to ease, influenced mainly by the energy component, the 
course of which will offset the gradual increase in core inflation, as a result of the 
foreseeable widening of the output gap and the expected acceleration in unit labour costs 
(Chart 1.4.D).
In the labour market, the latest available information shows some easing, during the 
summer months, in the buoyancy shown by employment in Q2. The seasonally adjusted 
quarter-on-quarter growth rate of employment fell by 0.5 pp to 0.5%, according to Spanish 
Labour Force Survey (EPA) Q3 data. However, this slowdown has coincided with a smaller 
increase in the workforce in Q3, making for a 2 pp reduction in the unemployment rate 
compared with the previous year, to 14.6% (Chart 1.5.A). 
Easy financing conditions and favourable macroeconomic developments have continued 
to boost recovery in the real estate market. Average prices rose by 6.8% in Q2 on the 
same period a year earlier, below the figure of 7.2% recorded six months earlier. In real 
terms, prices stand 33% below the 2007 peak, but 21% up on the 2014 low. The indicators 
based on national average prices do not show signs of across-the-board overvaluation in 
housing. Moreover, although the supply of new houses has also continued increasing (to 
95,000 in the 12 months to August 2018, over 25% up on the August 2017 figure), current 
levels are far below those reached before the crisis. Also, despite the fact that new 
housing loans have shown high growth (17.7% year-on-year in September), their volume 
is still lower than that of repayments, meaning their outstanding balance continues to 
contract. One characteristic of the current expansionary cycle of the real estate market is 
high heterogeneity, with a very sharp pick-up having been observed in prices in certain 
areas such as the major cities and the islands, and a very moderate one in other areas. 
Another key aspect is the fact that the rise in the value of housing has been accompanied 
by notable growth in property rentals, which act as a support to house values. This has 
occurred against the background of the surge in demand associated with the greater 
weight of tenancy status at the expense of owner-occupancy (Chart 1.5.B).
The financial position of households and non-financial corporations has continued to 
improve, prolonging the tendency of recent years and underpinned by the increase in 
incomes, the decline in debt and the recovery in asset values, especially real estate. 
Hence, in 2018 Q2 non-financial corporations’ debt/GDP ratio was already below the euro 
area average, and the related household ratio was scarcely 3 pp above the figure for the 
euro area countries (Chart 1.5.C). This, along with the diminished levels of the cost of debt, 
means that the debt burden has reached a very low level from a historical perspective. 
Nonetheless, given the prevalence of short-term and/or floating-rate financing, the financial 
position of some segments of these sectors might worsen in scenarios in which there are 
increases in borrowing costs that are not accompanied by an improvement in incomes. 
The most vulnerable agents will be those that build up high debt relative to their incomes. 
Under the corporate heading, the proportion of companies most exposed to this type of 
stress is comparatively greater among smaller firms and those that operate in the real 
estate development and construction sector.2 
2  See the Box “Impact of an increase in the cost of borrowing on the economic and financial situation of Spanish 
non-financial corporations”, Economic Bulletin 3/2018, Banco de España. 
The inflation rate will continue 
to be greatly influenced by the 
course of oil prices 
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improve, but some segments 
of these sectors might be 
vulnerable to a scenario of 
rising financing costs
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The general government sector continued to cut its budget deficit as a percentage of 
GDP, lowering it to 2.7% in June 2018 in 12-month cumulated terms. That, along with the 
recovery in nominal output, has contributed to checking the increase in the public debt/
GDP ratio. However, this ratio is still at a very high level (98.1% of GDP), meaning it is 
necessary to continue with the efforts to further budgetary consolidation (Chart 1.5.D). 
High public sector debt contributes to the Spanish economy’s international net financial 
position being notably in debit. The running of current and capital account surpluses in 
recent years (albeit with a slight declining trend in the recent period) has, in combination 
with GDP growth, enabled the net debit position to be cut by slightly more than 17 pp 
from its peak in 2014 Q2. That said, in 2018 Q2 this position was still at 82.4% of GDP. 
Spain’s gross external debt fell by 0.1 pp relative to GDP, to 168.2%, 6.4 pp down on its 
early 2015 peak.
Since the publication of the last FSR in May 2018, the economic and financial position of 
the various non-financial sectors of the Spanish economy has continued to improve, 
assisted by the prolongation of the macroeconomic upturn, the decline in debt and low 
borrowing costs. However, the debt levels of the general government sector and of the 
economy as a whole vis-à-vis the external sector remain high, which raises the Spanish 
economy’s vulnerability to any adverse future developments in activity or in financing 
conditions. 
In the short and medium term, the current upturn in the Spanish economy is expected to 
continue, albeit at more moderate rates than in the past. But this scenario is subject to 
high uncertainty, whereby there are some risks – external and domestic alike – that more 
unfavourable developments will unfold. The key external risks are linked to the potentially 
adverse course global financial conditions and an escalation of protectionist measures 
may take, and to political and geopolitical factors, including most notably a disorderly, 
hard Brexit and the uncertainty surrounding budgetary policy in Italy. Domestic risks 
include uncertainty over the future economic policy stance in the current setting of a 
fragmented parliament in Spain, and a possible rise in political tensions in Catalonia. 
General government debt  
and, consequently, that  
of the economy as a whole 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world 
remains at a high level 
There are risks of more 
adverse than expected 
macroeconomic developments 
unfolding, in a setting in which 
the high debt levels of the 
general government sector 
and of the nation vis-à-vis the 
rest of the world are a factor 
of vulnerability ahead of the 
potential materialisation of 
such risks 
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2 BANKING RISKS, PROFITABILITY AND SOLVENCY
International exposure
The consolidated assets of Spanish deposit institutions stood at €3,551 billion in June 
2018 (see Annex 1), down 0.5% from a year earlier. This slight decline in consolidated 
assets was the result of the fall in activity in Spain, where financial assets dropped by 
2.8% year-on-year. In contrast, the volume of financial assets abroad of Spanish banks 
rose with respect to the same month of the previous year (2.5% year-on-year), despite 
the strong depreciation of the currencies of countries in which Spanish banks have a 
significant presence, as discussed in Chapter 1. Thus, financial assets abroad, as a 
percentage of total consolidated financial assets, increased to over 45% in June 2018 
(see Chart 2.1).
Chart 2.2.A shows the geographical breakdown of the loans abroad of Spanish banks with 
significant international exposure. The activity abroad of Spanish banks is concentrated 
mainly in six countries which account for more than 70% of loans abroad: the United 
Kingdom (28.2%), the United States (14.9%), Mexico (8.6%), Brazil (8%), Portugal (6.5%) 
and Turkey (4.6%).
Chart 2.2.B shows the geographical breakdown of lending mostly to households and 
non-financial corporations in the main emerging countries with a presence of Spanish 
banks. Notable in Turkey and Peru is the importance of lending to non-financial 
corporations (more than 50% of total loans), while in Chile, Poland and Colombia lending 
to households accounts for more than 50% of total loans. Deposits with central banks are 
particularly important in Brazil and Argentina (accounting for more than 20% of the total). 
Lastly, in Mexico the proportion of lending to households and to non-financial corporations 
is more even.
Chart 2.3 shows the rate of change in euros of loans in the main countries, and the changes 
in the exchange rate of their respective currencies. Between June 2017 and June 2018, the 
2.1 Banking risks
2.1.1 CREDIT RISK
In June 2018, consolidated 
assets decreased by 0.5 % 
year-on-year as a result of  
the performance of business 
in Spain
Activity abroad is 
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Activity in emerging countries 
consists mainly of lending to 
households and non-financial 
corporations
The performance of business 
abroad was influenced...
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Total financial assets, which represent more than 90% of total assets, include loans and advances, debt securities, derivatives and equity instruments, and the 
distribution between business in Spain and business abroad is based on this magnitude.
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euro appreciated generally against the other currencies, particularly against the Turkish lira 
(33%), the Brazilian real (19.4%) and the Mexican peso (11.2%). The appreciation of the 
euro against these currencies helps to explain the decrease in the volume of loans in 
Turkey (–14.7%), Brazil (–9.2%) and Mexico (–1.6%). The volume of loans in Chile 
decreased by 16.4% despite the fact that the euro depreciated slightly (–0.5%) against the 
Chilean peso, due to some extent to the sale of part of the banking business by a Spanish 
bank. Conversely, in the United Kingdom, the United States and Poland the volume of 
loans grew despite the appreciation of the euro against their respective currencies. In 
Portugal, the integration of a Portuguese bank into a Spanish one led to a substantial 
increase in the volume of loans (67.4%).
The strong appreciation of the euro between June 2017 and June 2018, against the 
currencies of the main emerging countries in which Spanish banks operate, was fuelled in 
2018 Q3, particularly by the crisis that broke out in Turkey in August 2018, which led to 
notably higher volatility in foreign exchange markets, ultimately affecting the share prices of 
many European banks. Chart 2.4 shows the behaviour of share prices of European banks 
...by the widespread 
appreciation of the euro, 
particularly against the 
currencies of the main 
emerging countries in which 
Spanish deposit institutions 
operate (Mexico, Brazil and 
Turkey)
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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with the biggest exposure to Turkey. Box 2.1 describes in detail the country’s macroeconomic 
situation and its potential impact on Spanish banks with a presence there.
As regards international exposures, there are two issues worth noting. First, the fact that 
the nature of the risks affecting the exposures of advanced economies differs from those 
affecting emerging economies. The former are more linked to a potential change in the 
valuation of assets, while the risks affecting emerging countries are more often related to 
increases in NPL ratios. Second, Spanish deposit institutions conduct their business 
abroad following a decentralised liquidity and funding management model, in which each 
subsidiary must manage its needs independently. Moreover, as can be seen in Chart 2.5, 
activities abroad are conducted mainly in the local currency of the country in question. 
Specifically, in June 2018, 83.9% of the financial assets abroad were denominated in the 
local currency of the countries in which these assets were located. By country, the activities 
conducted in the local currency in Portugal, Brazil, the United States and Germany, 
accounted for more than 90% of total financial assets, followed by France and Chile, with 
more than 85%, and Poland, Mexico and the United Kingdom, where the percentage of 
business conducted in the local currency represented around 80% of total financial assets. 
Finally, Turkey exhibited the lowest proportion of activity in local currency, with a share of 
business denominated in Turkish lira that accounted for 60% of the total.
SOURCES: EBA and Datastream.
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The Turkish economy has been showing clear signs of overheating 
since 2017, as a result of lax fiscal and monetary policies and 
credit-boosting measures that have compounded its main 
macroeconomic imbalances. Thus, against a background of high 
GDP growth, which posted a rate of 7.4% in 2017 and in 2018 
Q1, and eased slightly to 5.2% in 2018 Q2, the inflation rate has 
held above 10% over the last 18 months, peaking in September 
at 24.5%, a 15-year high far above the Turkish central bank’s 
target of 5%. 
The dependence on external financing and the limited buffers 
available (international reserves) are the main vulnerabilities of the 
Turkish economy. The current account deficit has been widening, 
standing at 6.5% of GDP in mid-2018. Moreover, only a small 
portion of it is covered by foreign direct investment, while the 
central bank’s international reserves (without including those 
belonging to banks) scarcely cover two months’ imports. Gross 
external debt stands at 53% of GDP, and is predominantly 
denominated in foreign currency (58% in dollars and 33% in euro); 
further, one-quarter of such debt is short-term, thereby contributing 
to raising annual external refinancing needs, which amount to close 
to 27% of GDP. Most of this external debt corresponds to the 
private sector, in particular the banking and corporate sectors. 
These are largely funded by foreign currency, which makes them 
vulnerable to a deterioration in financial conditions and to a 
depreciation of the exchange rate. Lastly, it should be stressed that 
although public finances are fairly healthy, the central government 
deficit has also worsened, and it is forecast to be close to 2% of 
GDP at year-end, while public debt stands at 28% of GDP. 
Against this backdrop, the Turkish president decided last April to 
bring forward the presidential elections (scheduled for November 
2019) to June 2018, fuelling concerns already voiced by international 
investors about greater economic interventionism and possible 
interference in the central bank’s independence. Indeed, after 
raising the policy interest rate by 500 bp between April and June (to 
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SITUATION IN TURKEY BOX 2.1
SOURCES: Datastream, Bank of Turkey, Secretariat of the Turkish Treasury and IMF.
a IMF forecasts.
b Current account balance + FDI.
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Garanti Bankasi A.Ş (Garanti). BBVA is this bank’s biggest 
shareholder with a stake of 49.9%. Garanti is Turkey’s second-
biggest private bank and ranked third if the public banks are 
included, and has a market share of 11% in total assets as at June 
2018. It has assets totalling €73 billion, accounting for 11% of the 
BBVA group’s total assets. Garanti’s net profit as at June 2018 
totalled €748 million, although it contributes, in terms of the BBVA’s 
holding in the Turkish bank, €373 million, which accounts for 14% 
of the group’s attributed profit (€2.6 billion). 
Garanti is a commercial bank, with financial autonomy from 
BBVA (intra-group loans are very low), in keeping with the 
decentralised business model characterising the Spanish bank’s 
international operations. This means that one institution’s 
potential liquidity problems do not spread and affect the group 
as a whole; no obligations or liquidity facilities based on a 
commitment by the group towards the subsidiary are in place. 
Moreover, BBVA sets aside partial provisioning to mitigate the 
fluctuation of the Turkish lira in the value of its own funds and in 
the profit contributed by its investee. From the solvency 
standpoint, in the extremely hypothetical case that this stake 
were to be sold for a minimum amount, the impact on CET1 
capital ratio would be very limited.
As regards the future of the Turkish subsidiary, the main concerns 
are, first, the rollover of foreign currency-denominated wholesale 
funding. The only maturity this year is in November, involving a 
syndicated loan with a tranche in dollars of 405 million, and another 
for €649 million. A further concern is the economic slowdown and 
the depreciation of the Turkish lira, which will exert a significant 
impact on the impairment of the quality of the credit portfolio and, 
in particular, on borrowers who finance themselves in foreign 
currency (around 40% as at June 2018, concentrated in 
companies). Under the baseline scenario which the main 
international organisations are currently using, the impact that this 
would have on the group’s solvency would be limited.
17.75%), the central bank held its interest rates unchanged in 
August in a setting of turbulence on the emerging financial markets. 
This prompted fresh attacks against the Turkish lira, adding to which 
just a few days later were the effects of the escalation of geopolitical 
tensions between Turkey and the United States (with mutual 
retaliation in the trade arena). Hence, in the year to date the Turkish 
lira has depreciated by around 50% in nominal effective terms and 
the country’s sovereign debt yield has risen from around 12-14% as 
at late December 2017 to its current level of 21%. Further, Turkey’s 
sovereign spread (EMBI) has widened by 300 bp and the Turkish 
stock exchange has fallen by more than 20%. 
In terms of the economic policy response, the central bank and the 
banking supervision agency adopted a series of measures in August 
to provide liquidity to the banking system and to check the depreciation 
of the lira. As from mid-August, liquidity was supplied to banks at the 
overnight lending rate, entailing an effective rise in rates of 150 bp to 
19.25%. At the September monetary policy meeting, the central bank 
decided to raise the policy rate by 6.25 pp to 24%, managing to calm 
the markets. On the fiscal front, the Turkish government announced 
an as yet unspecified adjustment plan to reduce the budget deficit, 
although it also announced tax cuts. Likewise it has reiterated that no 
controls will be placed on capital outflows. The government has 
approached countries such as Qatar, Russia and China to obtain 
external financing. Indeed, in mid-August Qatar announced direct 
investment in Turkey worth $15 billion and both countries’ central 
banks entered into a swap agreement for $3 billion. 
Against this background of financial deterioration and the sharp – 
though reactive – economic policy adjustment, the economic 
outlook for Turkey is one of intense slowdown as from the second 
half of 2018, as already testified by the latest high-frequency 
indicators, with the country potentially going into recession in 2019. 
The only Spanish bank with significant economic interests in 
Turkey is BBVA, through its holding in the Turkish bank Türkiye 
ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SITUATION IN TURKEY (cont´d) BOX 2.1
Total non-performing assets 
The total volume of consolidated non-performing assets (including loans and debt 
securities) decreased further in 2018 H1 to €108.2 billion, a fall of 21.6% in year-on-year 
terms (see Annex 1). Thus, in June 2018, non-performing assets made up 3% of the 
consolidated total assets of Spanish deposit institutions, compared with 3.9% observed 
in June 2017.
The decrease in the total volume of consolidated non-performing assets pushed the total 
non-performing assets ratio down to 3.6%, a decrease of 97 bp with respect to that 
recorded a year earlier (4.5%). Excluding debt securities, the NPL ratio dropped from 5.3% 
in June 2017 to 4.1% a year later. 
Consolidated  
non-performing assets 
decreased by 21.6%  
year-on-year
The total non-performing 
assets ratio stood at 3.6%  
and the non-performing  
loans ratio at 4.1%
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Chart 2.6 shows the changes in non-performing loans abroad between June 2017 and June 
2018. The NPL ratio behaved unevenly in the six countries which, in aggregate terms, 
account for more than 70% of loans abroad (see Chart 2.6.A). Thus, while the NPL ratio 
continued to hold below 2% in the United Kingdom, the United States and Mexico, in 
Portugal it fell from 8% in June 2017 to 5.5% in June 2018. This decline resulted from the 
increase in the volume of loans following the integration of a Portuguese bank into a Spanish 
institution, which also entailed an increase in the volume of NPLs (see Chart 2.6.B). By 
contrast, the NPL ratio in Turkey doubled to stand at 4.5%. As regards the other countries 
analysed, the ratio remained between 4% and 4.5% in Brazil and Chile and slightly above 
5% in Poland. In Germany and France, the ratio held at around 2% and 1%, respectively.
Domestic exposure
The data drawn from individual financial statements allow the activity of Spanish deposit 
institutions relating to their business in Spain to be analysed. Broadly, 2018 H1 saw a 
continuation of the main trends that have characterised domestic exposure in recent 
years: moderate fall in lending and significant reduction of troubled assets. In fact, the 
decrease in lending can largely be explained by the behaviour of these assets, as discussed 
in the following section.
In June 2018, credit granted by deposit institutions to the resident private sector in Spain 
fell by 2.9% year-on-year (see Chart 2.7.A). This rate is very close to that observed twelve 
months earlier and is, in fact, also very similar to all those recorded since the beginning 
The non-performing loans 
ratio generally remained stable 
in the main countries where 
Spanish deposit institutions 
are present, with the exception 
of Portugal and Turkey, where 
the behaviour was mixed
Lending to the resident  
private sector declined 
moderately, continuing...
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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of 2017. Thus, outstanding credit to the resident private sector stood at €1,174 billion, 
with a cumulative decline of €677 billion from the peak reached in December 2008, which 
represents a decrease of 37%. 
Since the publication of the previous FSR, the behaviour of lending to households has 
been slightly more positive than that of total lending, while lending to non-financial 
corporations has moved in the opposite direction. Specifically, lending to households fell 
by 0.5% in June 2018 in year-on-year terms, against –1.8% observed in June 2017 and 
–1.3% recorded in December of that year. Meanwhile, lending to non-financial corporations 
declined by 4.9% in the past year, compared with –3.5% in June 2017 or –3.1% in 
December 2017. This change in trend is due to two factors: the increase in consumer 
credit and the notable further decline in the construction and real estate sectors, largely as 
a result of the sale of part of the non-performing loans portfolio. In fact, if lending for 
construction and real estate activities is excluded from the total volume of lending to the 
resident private sector, the behaviour of lending was more favourable, with a decline of 
only 1.2% in the past year (see Chart 2.7.B). If, moreover, loans for house purchases are 
excluded (the other large segment of loans facing major adjustments since the onset of the 
crisis), the rates of change are close to zero. In addition, mention should also be made of 
the role played by the higher profit margins and some of the non-conventional monetary 
...the trend of recent quarters
The decline in lending  
to households moderated  
in comparison with previous 
years, but accelerated in  
the case of non-financial 
corporations
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a This series includes securitisations.
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policy measures of the European Central Bank (specifically, the private debt purchase 
programmes) in the decrease in lending to firms.
In lending to households, the behaviour of loans for house purchase differed greatly from 
that granted for other purposes, basically consumer credit. While the former decreased by 
1.8% in June 2018 in year-on-year terms, the latter grew by 5.7% in the same period, 
thereby continuing the upward trend seen since mid-2016, when the first positive rates of 
change were recorded for this segment of lending (see Chart 2.7.C). For more detail on 
recent developments in consumer credit, see Box 2.2. 
The behaviour of lending to non-financial corporations also differed greatly depending on 
the sector of activity of the firm receiving the loan. While loans to the construction and real 
estate sector fell by 14.9% in the past year (exceeding the rate of 8.1% observed in June 
2017), those granted to other sectors posted a negative rate of only 0.7% year-on-year. It 
should be noted that the behaviour of loans to non-financial corporations for purposes 
other than construction and real estate activities has been very similar since 2014, with 
near-zero rates across the board.
The behaviour of non-performing assets had a significant impact on the rates of change of 
credit. If only credit classified as performing is taken into account, the total outstanding 
balance of deposit institutions decreased by only 0.7% year-on-year, with positive rates of 
change of up to 1.5% in the sector of non-financial corporations other than those engaged 
in construction and real estate activities.
Chart 2.8.A shows the distribution of the rate of change of credit granted for real estate 
activities and construction, and the increase in the variability between institutions in 2018, 
compared with that observed in 2017. This is due to the sale by certain banks of part of 
their NPL portfolios, resulting in unusually negative rates of change, which do not reflect 
the actual behaviour of lending at the bank in question. Therefore, what happens when this 
segment of loans is excluded needs to be analysed. Chart 2.8.B shows the distribution of 
the rate of change of credit granted for other purposes (not construction and real estate), 
and reveals greater homogeneity and a slight shift of the distribution towards less negative 
rates of change in the past year.
In households, the behaviour 
of lending for purposes other 
than house purchase was 
more favourable, with year-on-
year growth of 5.7%
In non-financial corporations, 
there was a further sharp 
decline in construction and 
real estate loans, partly 
prompted by the sale of this 
sector’s non-performing loans
There lower rate of decline in 
lending was across the board, 
although the rates of change 
varied more widely in the case 
of the real estate activities and 
construction sector
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The graph shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of the year-on-year rates of change in credit for Spanish deposit institutions, weighted by the credit 
corresponding to each institution. This density function is approximated through a kernel estimator which allows a non-parametric estimate of the density function, 
yielding a continuous and smoothed graphical representation of that function.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSUMER CREDIT BOX 2.2
The previous FSR specifically examined the issue of consumer 
credit, pointing out that the performance of this segment of lending 
and its NPL rates would be monitored closely in coming quarters. 
Accordingly, the purpose of this box is to follow up and further 
elaborate on Box 2.1 of the May 2018 FSR. The segment of lending 
to households for purposes other than house purchase can be 
broken down into consumer credit and credit for other purposes. 
This box focuses on analysing consumer credit through its two 
components: credit for purchase of consumer durables and credit 
for purchase of other goods and services. In the second part of the 
box, the analysis is extended to include specialised lending 
institutions (SLIs), whose importance in the consumer credit 
segment is far from negligible, as explained below. 
Chart A shows the expansionary pattern of consumer credit in 
recent years,1 from €44.4 billion in June 2015 to €62.8 billion in 
June 2018 (growth of over 40%). Within consumer credit, loans for 
purchase of consumer durables account for the bulk of growth, 
increasing from €20.5 billion in June 2015 to almost €35 billion in 
June 2018 (growth of 70%), while loans for purchase of goods and 
services also increased, but not as much (by 16.5%, from €23.9 
billion to €27.9 billion). Thus, the weight of loans for consumer 
durables has risen by 10 pp in the last three years, from 46% in 
June 2015 to 56% in June 2018. In any event, consumer credit 
granted by deposit institutions accounts for 5.3% of total credit to 
the resident private sector. 
Since the publication of the previous FSR, a slight slowdown has 
been observed in consumer credit extended by Spanish deposit 
institutions for purchase of consumer durables, from 27% in 
December 2017 and 28% in March 2018, to 23% in June 2018. 
In this segment, NPL rates for consumer credit have risen by 8.6% 
in the past year, driven by the strong growth of the NPL rates of 
loans for purchase of consumer durables. NPLs for this segment of 
lending grew by 22.6% between June 2017 and June 2018, while 
1  The data that appear in this box include, from July 2017, the business of 
a former specialised lending institution that was integrated into a deposit 
institution at that date.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSUMER CREDIT (cont´d)
growth in lending (€1.5 billion) was somewhat higher than that of 
NPLs (€0.04 billion). 
Lastly, Chart D presents the NPL ratios of the two components of 
consumer credit. The NPL ratio of loans for purchase of consumer 
durables stood at 3.2% in June 2018, while that of purchase of 
other goods and services was 7.4%. Both ratios have fallen since 
2015, but that of loans for purchase of consumer durables has 
declined to a greater extent. In any event, it should be noted that 
there is a time lag between credit growth and NPL growth. Although 
NPL ratios are not yet on the rise, their behaviour warrants close 
attention, as the accelerated growth of consumer credit could 
translate into a surge in NPLs in the future. 
In the remaining section of the box the analysis of consumer credit 
extended by specialised lending institutions is added. In June 2018, 
this amounted to more than €22 billion and accounted for 26.2% of 
consumer credit granted by deposit institutions and SLIs as a whole. 
A total of 70% of the consumer credit business of SLIs corresponds 
BOX 2.2
those for the purchase of other goods and services increased to a 
much lesser extent, by barely 2.1%. Since the last FSR, the NPL 
growth rate for durable goods quickened notably, from 7% in 
December 2017 to 19% in March 2018, and then to 22.6% in June 
2018, as mentioned above. 
Charts B and C break down the NPL ratios of loans for consumer 
durables and for other goods and services, respectively, into 
variations of the numerator (NPLs) and the denominator (credit). 
Chart B shows how the NPL ratio of loans for purchase of consumer 
durables has declined in recent years owing to the sustained 
growth in lending, with similar NPL levels in 2018 to those observed 
in 2015 (around €1.1 billion). However, there have been significant 
differences in the behaviour of NPL rates in the past year in this 
type of lending, with a reversal of the previous fall and an increase 
in volume of more than 20%, against a setting of economic growth 
and declining unemployment rates. As can be observed in Chart C, 
the slight reduction in the NPL ratio of loans for purchase of other 
goods and services in the past year is due to the fact that the 
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By firm size, lending to large firms fell by 3.1% in the past year, compared with the decrease 
of 7.2% in lending to SMEs in the same period (see Chart 2.9.A). This more negative 
behaviour is partly due to the greater weight of lending for construction and real estate 
activities in total credit to SMEs, compared with large firms. Since 2014, in the SME sector, 
the weight of the smallest (microfirms) and largest (medium-sized) firms has increased to 
the detriment of those of intermediate size (small firms, see Chart 2.9.B).
Given the behaviour of troubled assets, partly the result of active management by banks 
and supervisory pressure, new lending in recent months should be analysed. In the first 
half of 2018, deposit institutions in Spain granted loans amounting to €207 billion to the 
By firm size, the fall in lending 
was more pronounced in the 
case of SMEs, owing to their 
higher concentration in the 
sectors which have undergone 
greater adjustments
New lending granted in the 
first six months of 2018 rose 
with respect to the same...
BOX 2.2RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSUMER CREDIT (cont´d)
would appear to show that, given the improvement in both 
economic activity and the employment rate, consumer decisions 
that had been postponed in previous years, are now being taken. 
As regards prices in this segment of lending, Chart H shows that 
interest rates for new consumer credit with maturities of one to five 
years in Spain are considerably higher than those applied in the 
main European countries. In June 2018, the average rate for these 
operations in Spain was 7.8%, compared with 4.9% in the euro 
area. In the current low interest rate environment in which banks 
operate, the high rates for this type of lending may be prompting 
banks to seek opportunities to obtain higher returns but at the 
potential cost of assuming higher risks. 
To conclude, the most active segment of bank lending continues 
to post a high growth rate, although somewhat more moderate in 
the last quarter. Its NPL rates have continued to increase, but this 
has not yet translated into a higher NPL ratio. However, the time 
lag between credit growth and NPL growth means that consumer 
credit and its NPL rates should continue to be analysed in depth in 
coming quarters. Banks should continue to monitor the behaviour 
or non-performing loans, providing adequate coverage for new 
NPLs, and pay close attention to the lending conditions for this 
type of loans, avoiding any easing of the credit standards required 
to ensure that this, more profitable, lending, does not end up 
having the highest risk, as a result of the losses it may entail. 
Moreover, on the demand side, it should be borne in mind that the 
household saving ratio stood at 4.4% of household disposable 
income in 2018 Q2, 5 pp down on two years earlier. Sooner or later, 
very fast credit growth is always associated with higher risk levels 
and NPL rates, and this should prompt banks to carefully examine 
the sustainability of such growth rates, to ensure that they are in 
keeping with the desired risk profile.
to subsidiaries of Spanish banks. The remainder is mostly in the 
hands of financial companies of car manufacturers and some foreign 
bank branches (particularly European). Consumer credit granted by 
deposit institutions and SLIs increased by 15.2% year-on-year in 
June 2018, a similar growth rate to that of previous quarters, albeit 
slightly lower. By component, as Chart E shows, loans for purchase 
of consumer durables grew the most, by 21.3 % in June 2018, but 
at a slower pace than that recorded in previous quarters. Loans for 
purchase of other goods and services increased by 8%, accelerating 
their growth with respect to the previous period. 
In recent quarters, NPLs for purchase of consumer durables have 
increased further to €1.4 billion (24.9% in June 2018), outstripping 
the rate of change of NPLs for purchase of other goods and 
services (8.2%), which rose to €2.6 billion. As a result, NPL rates 
for consumer credit increased by 13.6% in June 2018 (see Chart 
F). These rates are somewhat higher than those observed 
exclusively for deposit institutions, especially in loans for other 
goods and services (8.6% for consumer credit, 22.6% for durables 
and 2.1% for other goods). The NPL ratio of loans for consumer 
durables is relatively lower (2.9% in June 2018) than that of loans 
for other goods and services (7.1%), such that, as was the case 
when only considering deposit institutions, loans for purchase of 
consumer durables are comparatively better in terms of credit 
quality. Both ratios are slightly lower than those of credit extended 
exclusively by deposit institutions, and their behaviour in recent 
years is very similar to that mentioned for deposit institutions. 
In the European comparison2, shown in Chart G, the trend 
described in the previous FSR is maintained. Consumer credit in 
Spain has continued to increase at rates that are significantly 
higher than those of the main European countries (the European 
average was 7% in June 2018), as has been the case since mid-
2016. The trend in recent years contrasts with that observed in 
2011 and 2012, when consumer credit in Spain fell more sharply 
than in other European countries. Accordingly, the recent 
performance may be explained, at least in part, by the lower 
starting levels that are now beginning to recover. This behaviour 
2  This comparison, as with that of interest rates in Chart H, is based on 
data taken from the ECB’s Balance Sheet Items database, which 
includes credit extended by deposit institutions and by SLIs, as 
discussed in the second part of the box.
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resident private sector, which is €24.6 billion more (13.5%) than in the first half of 2017 (see 
Chart 2.10.A and B). There was an increase in both new lending to households (€4.2 billion 
more than in 2017 H1) and, most notably, to non-financial corporations, which were 
granted loans amounting to €16 billion from January to June 2018 (up 14.2%). Credit 
relating to new transactions increased for all firms sizes (see Chart 2.10.C and D). As a 
result of this expansionary trend, both in households and non-financial corporations, the 
percentage of the stock of total lending represented by new lending increased moderately 
in the past year, from 15.1% to 17.6%.
New mortgage loans for house purchase rose to €18.6 billion in the first six months of 
2018, which is 17.3% more than in the same period in 2017. However, it should be noted 
that, in annualised terms, this marked increase accounts for only 7.3% of the total volume 
in this segment of loans, which is considerably lower than in the pre-crisis years, when this 
percentage exceeded 30%.
The acceptance rate of loans requested from banks with which firms are not currently 
operating, in six-month moving average terms, was nearly 31% at end-June 2018, down 1 
pp from the rate observed in the same period of 2017. Since early 2009, fluctuations of 
around 30% have been observed in this rate (see Chart 2.11.A). The underlying changes are 
largely due to the more negative trend in the number of approvals, rather than to changes 
in the number of applications. Thus, the year-on-year rate of change in the number of 
approvals declined until June (–15%), and was more pronounced than the year-on-year 
decrease observed in the number of applications (–9%). By sector, this overall pattern 
reflects the overall performance of firms that are not in the construction and real estate 
sector, while the acceptance rate for the latter has held steady at around 34% since 2015.
Interest rates on new loans remained stable in the case of households, both in consumer 
and house purchase loans. Interest rates on loans to non-financial corporations followed 
diverging paths, depending on the size of the firm. In smaller-sized firms, interest rates 
continued their downward trend of recent years, while in larger firms, a slight increase 
has been observed since the beginning of 2018, which has partly closed the gap between 
the rates applied to loans granted to firms in these size brackets (see Chart 2.11.B). 
As regards the conditions for real-estate mortgage loans, Chart 2.11.C shows the changes 
in the average loan-to-value (LTV) ratio of mortgages to individuals in the last 15 years, 
...period of 2017, both to 
households and particularly  
to non-financial corporations, 
where growth was observed 
across firms of all sizes
The acceptance rate of loan 
applications was down slightly 
with respect to the previous 
year, owing to the behaviour  
of approved requests
Interest rates remained stable, 
except in the case of lending 
to larger firms, where they 
have risen slightly since the 
beginning of 2018
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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broken down into two series: the simple average of LTVs of all loans and a weighted 
average, depending on the amount of loan principal. The data refers to the flow of new 
mortgage loans and can thus be used to approximate the behaviour of the credit standards 
applied by banks at any given time. Both measures have remained relatively stable since 
2016, although at historically high levels.
It is also useful to analyse the distribution of the LTVs (see Chart 2.11.D). This allows the 
changes in financing conditions to be analysed, that is, to determine whether banks are 
granting loans with higher risk levels (high LTV ratios). Since the start of the economic 
recovery, the relative weight of loans with LTVs between 60% and 80% has steadily 
increased. The fact that new loans are concentrated in this segment partly explains the 
reported increase of average LTVs (see Chart 2.11.C). The relative significance of these 
mortgages has increased to the detriment of loans with LTVs of less than 60%. The 
segment of loans with LTVs of over 80%, considered to be that with the highest risk, has 
remained stable. An interesting development in the real estate market is the growth 
observed in the sector of listed real estate investment companies (SOCIMIs, by their 
Spanish abbreviation). Box 2.3 analysis the main trends in this segment and their potential 
implications for financial stability.
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a These are already existing loans in which there is a positive change in the principal drawn down and include those granted to financial firms, non-financial firms 
and households.
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In June 2018, according to individual financial statements, the volume of forborne loans to the 
resident private sector stood at €79.3 billion, down 23.1% year-on-year. This across-the-board 
decrease was the result of the sharp decline of forborne loans in non-financial corporations, 
even though there was a slight increase in the case of households in the same period.
Troubled assets 
NPLs decreased by €27.4 billion with respect to the previous year, to stand at €74.8 billion 
in June (see Chart 2.12.A). This is largely explained by the positive performance of the 
Spanish economy in the past year, and by the active management of troubled assets by 
deposit institutions and supervisory pressure. In percentage terms, there was a decrease 
of 26.7%, higher than that observed in June 2017 (–13%) and December 2017 (–15.5%). 
Since their peak in December 2013, NPLs have been reduced by more than €114 billion 
(60.2%). The total volume of NPLs to the resident private sector stood at 2009 levels, to a 
large extent as a result of their behaviour in the construction and real estate sector.
The substantial decrease  
in forborne loans with respect 
to the previous year was 
widespread across banks
Non-performing loans 
continued on the downward 
path seen in recent years, 
accumulating a decline of 
60.2% since December 2013
SOURCES: Association of Registrars, INE and Banco de España.
a Non-financial corporations which apply for a loan to an institution with which they are not working or with which they have not maintained a credit relationship 
in the last three months. The acceptance rate is defined as the ratio of the transactions accepted by deposit institutions to the total applications received in a 
particular month.
b The new loans of a period are defined as all the first-time loans arranged with customers and all the contracts existing in earlier periods whose amount, interest 
rate, maturity or other significant financial conditions in relation to interest rates have been renegotiated with customers in the month in question.
c Include all mortgages to individuals secured with residential property as collateral, according to the information provided by the Association of Spanish Property 
and Commercial Registrars.
d Mortgages to individuals secured with residential property as collateral.
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NPLs in lending to households decreased by €2.1 billion in the past year, to €31.5 billion in 
June 2018, representing a year-on-year decline of 6.2 %. Since December 2013, the 
decrease has amounted to €14.7 billion in absolute terms and 31.9 % in percentage terms. 
In lending to non-financial corporations, the decrease in NPLs was much more significant. 
Between June 2017 and June 2018, they declined by €25.2 billion (36.8%). Since their 
peak in December 2013, NPLs have now decreased by €95.1 billion (–68.7%). 
NPLs declined both in 
households and non-financial 
corporations, albeit much 
more markedly in the latter
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a The graph shows the density function (or frequency distribution) of the NPL ratio for Spanish deposit institutions, weighted by the credit corresponding to each 
institution. This density function is approximated through a kernel estimator which allows a non-parametric estimate of the density function, yielding a continuous 
and smoothed graphical representation of that function.
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The growth of SOCIMIs (Sociedades Anónimas Cotizadas de 
Inversión en el Mercado Inmobiliario), which are similar to the Real 
Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) that are well established in other 
jurisdictions, is one of the most significant recent developments in 
the Spanish real estate market. The corporate purpose of these 
firms, which in Spain must be listed in organised markets, is to 
“acquire and develop urban real estate for rental” (Law 11/2009).1 
In general they focus on acquiring housing and, essentially, 
commercial real estate, such as offices or shopping malls, mostly 
assets at the top end of the market and/or in city centre locations 
(prime segment). 
According to data provided by Reuters, there are currently just 
over 60 SOCIMIs registered in Spain, although the bulk of the 
activity is concentrated among just a few of those companies. On 
end-2017 data, SOCIMIs account for around 5% of the assets of 
real estate firms (developers, construction firms and sector 
intermediaries).2 Their asset volume has more than tripled since 
2014, coinciding with the recovery in the real estate market. 
Various factors have contributed to the growth of SOCIMIs. First, 
their improved tax regime under Law 16/2012,3 which grants these 
firms zero-rated corporate income tax provided certain conditions 
are met (for example, that the majority of their income comes from 
real estate rentals and that most of their profit is distributed to 
shareholders). Second, the strong investment appetite for these 
vehicles, possibly heightened by the low interest rate environment. 
In this respect, the proportion of SOCIMIs among new market 
issuances is notable (they now account for the bulk of new IPOs; 
see Chart A). Lastly, the possible connection between the sharp 
price increase in recent years in the prime commercial real estate 
segment and the strength of these vehicles.
In this setting, a question arises: could the expansion of SOCIMIs 
pose risks for financial stability? It is important to note that the 
rapid growth of SOCIMIs’ balance sheets derives not only from the 
acquisition and subsequent rental of real estate assets, but also 
from the acquisition of fellow SOCIMIs and real estate firms. Partly 
as a result of these developments, SOCIMIs’ capital expenditure 
(CAPEX) is relatively high, especially when compared with that of 
traditional real estate sector players (construction firms, for 
instance).4 
Despite these tendencies, SOCIMIs’ leverage, measured as the ratio 
of assets to own funds, has remained stable in recent years and, 
moreover, below that of the other Spanish stock market sectors (see 
Chart B, which compares SOCIMIs’ CAPEX and leverage with the 
median CAPEX and leverage of the other listed sectors). Accordingly, 
the favourable environment in which SOCIMIs operate does not 
appear to have given rise to date to a problem of overindebtedness. 
However, it should be borne in mind that leverage metrics are 
sensitive to asset values: were assets to become overvalued, the 
low leverage reported could be only apparent, while a sudden drop 
in asset prices would boost leverage. In addition, SOCIMIs could 
use their real estate portfolios as collateral to raise funding, thus 
increasing their future leverage. Moreover, a collateral value shock 
could hamper their CAPEX policies. 
NEW REAL ESTATE MARKET FIRMS: SOCIMIS BOX 2.3
1  Law 11/2009 of 26 October 2009 regulating SOCIMIs
2  Estimation based on Central Balance Sheet Data Office (Banco de 
España) data.
3  Law 16/2012 of 27 December 2012 adopting various tax measures 
aimed at consolidating public finances and stimulating economic 
activity.
4  CAPEX is proxied by total investment outflows, according to individual 
firms’ cash flow statements compiled by Reuters.
SOURCES: Bolsas y Mercados Españoles (BME), Reuters and Banco de España.
a Includes public and subscription offerings.
b Excludes sectors with leverage ratio of more than six to one.
c Information up until September.
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In household lending, the decrease in NPLs was far more significant in loans for house 
purchase (–8.2% year-on-year in June 2018) than in those granted for other purposes, 
basically, but not only, consumer credit (–1.7%), conditioned by the increase in NPLs in 
lending for the purchase of consumer durables (22.7%). House purchase NPLs fell at a 
faster pace than in the previous year (2.1% year-on-year), while in other lending to 
households, the change was significant, with positive rates of change of 9% year-on-year 
in June 2017. 
By sector of activity (see Chart 2.12.B), in lending to non-financial corporations, NPLs 
declined by 53% in construction and real estate activities, that is, the volume of NPLs in 
this sector decreased by €18.2 billion. As mentioned earlier, such a significant decline 
was due to several factors, including the sale by some banks of their NPL portfolios, 
which have consequently been removed from their respective balance sheets. Other 
sectors have also seen a marked decline in the past year, of €7.1 billion, or 20.6% in 
percentage terms.
The sale by some banks of their NPL portfolios in the real estate and construction sector 
led to markedly uneven behaviour across banks and in the case of NPLs (see Chart 2.12.C). 
If these sectors of activity are excluded from the analysis, a greater degree of uniformity 
can be observed in the period. In any event, there has been a shift to the left-hand side of 
the distribution (larger decreases in NPLs), compared with that observed in June 2017 (see 
Chart 2.12.D).
Chart 2.13 shows the NPL developments from December 2013 to June 2018, in terms of 
additions and removals. In the first half of 2018, a total of €13.6 billion was classified under 
new NPLs, representing a change of –15.5% with respect to the first six months of the 
previous year, and accounting for 14.3% of total NPLs in December 2017. Although the 
weight of new NPLs in the total (in annualised terms) has remained relatively stable in 
recent years, it should be noted that these additions continue to decline in absolute terms. 
With respect to removals, a total of €27.1 billion are no longer classed as NPLs on the 
balance sheets of deposit institutions in Spain, largely owing to recoveries. 
Whereas in households, the 
decrease was more marked in 
loans for house purchase,…
… in the case of  
non-financial corporations 
there was a very significant 
decline across sectors, 
especially in construction  
and real estate,…
… largely owing to  
the sale by certain banks  
of their troubled loan portfolios 
in these sectors
In the first half of 2018, a 
smaller quantity of loans were 
classified as non-performing 
than in the same period the 
previous year, and there were 
also more recoveries
BOX 2.3NEW REAL ESTATE MARKET FIRMS: SOCIMIS (cont´d)
advantage, reducing the banking sector’s direct links to a business 
as volatile as real estate. In addition, market issuances facilitate 
risk monitoring by third parties (investors, credit rating agencies).
To sum up, the SOCIMI sector is expanding significantly, even 
though the SOCIMIs themselves are still small in size compared 
with real estate firms overall. In addition, their funding structure is 
different from that of the traditional sector players, which means 
that the risk of possible financial stress at SOCIMIs having a 
significant impact on the Spanish banking sector seems limited at 
present, given the relatively low level of funding that Spanish banks 
currently provide to these firms.
Compared with traditional construction sector firms, SOCIMIs 
obtain more of their funds from capital markets and are less reliant 
on bank finance. Indeed, on CCR data, at end-2017 only 20% of 
their assets were funded by loans from Spanish banks (exposure 
to the sector at that date amounted to €6.7 billion). In general, the 
investor base of SOCIMIs’ shares is predominantly made up of 
investment funds and similar vehicles, generally based outside 
Spain (among the large SOCIMIs, almost a third of shareholders 
are non-residents). As these investors tend to reduce their 
exposure more rapidly under stress, the cost of funding of SOCIMIs 
could be more sensitive to changes in market sentiment. By 
contrast, their lower level of reliance on bank finance could be an 
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The significant decrease in NPLs, despite the reduction in new loans, has translated into 
the NPL ratio decreasing further, continuing the trend observed in recent years. Specifically, 
the NPL ratio of lending to the resident private sector in business in Spain stood at 6.4% 
in June 2018, down 2.1 pp in the past year (see Chart 2.14.A). In percentage points, this 
year-on-year decrease was 1.1 pp in June 2017 and 1.4 pp in December 2017, showing a 
faster pace of decline in recent quarters. From the highest value of the series, the NPL ratio 
of the resident private sector has fallen by 7.5 pp.
By sector (see Chart 2.14.B), the year-on-year decrease was far more pronounced in 
non-financial corporations (4.5 pp, to 9% in June 2018) than in households (5.1% at the 
last available date, and 0.3 pp higher 12 months earlier). In household lending, the NPL 
ratio of loans for house purchase fell by 0.3 pp in the past year to 4.3%, while that of 
lending for other purposes decreased by 0.6 pp to 8.6%, in the same period. Therefore, 
it has been observed that the segment of lending with the highest profit margin, that of 
loans for purposes other than housing, including consumer credit, also has the highest 
NPL ratios. Box 2.2 analyses in greater detail the NPL ratios by components of 
consumer credit. 
In the case of non-financial corporations, the NPL ratio fell more sharply in loans for 
construction and real estate activities, by more than 10 pp to 12.7% in June 2018. In loans 
for other purposes, the NPL ratio fell to a lesser degree, by 1.9 pp year-on-year to 7.7% at 
the last available date. The aforementioned active management (sale) by banks of NPLs in 
this sector and supervisory pressure have undoubtedly influenced developments in its 
NPL ratio in the past year.
The NPL ratio decreased across all sizes of non-financial corporations (see Chart 2.15.A). 
The largest decrease was observed in SMEs (–6.9 pp) and, within this category, in the 
smallest firms (microfirms), with a year-on-year decline of 8.3 pp. Thus, SMEs had an NPL 
ratio of 11.7% in June 2018, while that of large firms decreased by 2.5 pp to 6.1%. 
However, despite the larger reduction in the NPL ratio of the smallest firms, a firm’s size 
and its NPL ratio continue to be inversely related (see Chart 2.15.B). 
If the favourable economic conditions and supervisory pressure are maintained, and banks 
continue to sell their stock of non-productive assets, the NPL ratio can be expected to 
As a result of developments 
affecting the numerator and 
denominator, the NPL ratio of 
the resident private continued 
on a downward trend,…
…, more pronounced in  
non-financial corporations 
than households
In the case of non-financial 
corporations, and in line with 
the notable decrease in non-
performing loans, the ratio fell 
more sharply in the construction 
and real estate sector
Although the ratio fell  
across non-financial 
corporations of all sizes,  
the largest decrease was  
in SMEs
The growth of the economy, 
along with the active...
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Shown beside each bar is the percentage each item represents of the total NPLs at the beginning of the period. NPLs recovered include non-performing loans that 
become performing again, foreclosed assets and NPLs sold to third parties. Note that the last period corresponds to six months and not to a whole year as in the 
rest of the chart.
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continue to decrease. On this basis, if banks manage to sell all their NPL portfolios from 
the construction and real estate sector, the NPL ratio would fall to levels close to 5%. 
Moreover, an internal model developed for the purpose of forecasting the NPL ratio of 
credit to the resident private sector, based on the Spanish economy’s main macroeconomic 
variables, estimates that by 2020 the value of this ratio will stand at around 4%.1 It should 
be noted that this forecast is based on the historical relationship between the NPL ratio 
and macroeconomic variables and does not include the NPL portfolio sales forecast. In 
fact, the model’s forecast for June 2018 was 50 bp higher than the current NPL ratio, 
which shows an improvement resulting from the active management of troubled asset 
portfolios. In short, NPLs have continued on the path of recent years, declining at a faster 
pace in the last 12 months. 
In 2017, foreclosed assets or assets received in payment of debts from the activity of 
banks in Spain continued to decrease. Chart 2.16 shows the changes in their gross book 
value in recent years. In this chart, the trend followed since 2013, showing a gradual 
improvement in the sale of foreclosed asset by banks can be observed. The slight fall in 
1  See the 2017 Annual Report of the Banco de España https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/SES/Secciones/Publicaciones/
PublicacionesAnuales/InformesAnuales/17/Descargar/Fich/Inf2017.pdf.
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SOURCE: Banco de España.
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new foreclosed assets has contributed to reducing the total stock of such assets, which 
amounted to a total of nearly €64 billion at end-December 2017. Looking ahead, 
confirmation of the recently announced sales of foreclosed asset portfolios by banks 
would almost halve the volume of these assets on banks’ balance sheets.
So far in 2018, the systemic risk indicator (SRI), which presents in a single indicator the 
level of stress in the financial markets, has increased twice, although with a limited 
impact in terms of value and time on both occasions (see Chart 2.17.A). In the first week 
of February 2018 it rose slightly due to the sharp price adjustments and to the higher US 
stock market volatility and its spread by contagion to the Spanish markets. The second 
increase, somewhat higher than the first, but equally subdued, took place at the end of 
May, mainly as a result of the political uncertainty in Italy. Since then, the SRI has held at 
low levels.
2.1.2 SYSTEMIC RISK
So far this year, the SRI has 
increased on two occasions, 
albeit with a limited impact in 
terms of value and time
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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a Shown beside each bar is the percentage each item represents of the total foreclosed assets at the beginning of the year.
b Group 1 institutions were Banco Financiero y de Ahorros, NCG Banco, Catalunya Banc (currently integrated in BBVA) and Banco de Valencia (currently integrated 
in La Caixa).
c Group 2 institutions were BMN (currently integrated in Bankia), Liberbank, Caja3 (currently integrated in Ibercaja) and CEISS (currently integrated in Unicaja).
d The adjustment of the gross book value of Banco Popular Español's foreclosed assets corresponds to their value net of provisions at the date of resolution 
(June 2017).
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The contribution of Spanish banks to the systemic risk of the euro area as a whole is 
quantified by means of a model known as CoVaR.2 Following episodes of systemic alert 
recorded during the crisis, the average CoVaR of Spanish banks has since remained at 
much lower levels (see Chart 2.17.B). Likewise, at European level, the contribution to 
systemic risk from the banks that could be considered as most systemically important has 
declined after the crisis. However, the fact that Spanish banks have moved nearer to the 
bound delimited by the 5th percentile of euro area banks indicates that the contribution to 
systemic risk from Spanish banks has increased in relative terms with respect to the rest 
of the European system, although in absolute terms its contribution has decreased. Since 
the previous FSR there have been two sporadic rises mainly affecting the 5th percentile of 
euro area banks. These increases arose from certain upsurges in market volatility in June 
and August 2018 relating to the situation in Italy and Turkey, which appear to have had a 
greater impact on European banks than on Spanish banks.
The euro area interbank markets have continued to show very low activity, particularly 
in the unsecured segment, as evidenced by the EONIA trading volume, which since 
2 For an explanation of the CoVaR model, see the May 2015 FSR.
2.1.3 FUNDING RISK
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España.
a For a detailed explanation of this indicator, see Box 1.1 in the May 2013 FSR .
b The CoVaR model is used to calculate the impact that a situation of bank stress would have on the financial system. The sample used in the CoVaR calculation 
comprises a total of 33 listed Spanish and euro area institutions.
SYSTEMIC RISK CHART 2.17
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17 Jan-18
 GOVERNMENT DEBT MARKET  MONEY MARKET  SECURITIES MARKET
 BANK FUNDING MARKET  CORRELATION  SRI
A  SYSTEMIC RISK INDICATOR (SRI) (a)
-14
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
Jan-07 Jan-08 Jan-09 Jan-10 Jan-11 Jan-12 Jan-13 Jan-14 Jan-15 Jan-16 Jan-17 Jan-18
B  CONTRIBUTION OF SPANISH BANKS TO SYSTEMIC RISK MEASURED THROUGH CoVaR (b)
 SPANISH BANKS  EURO AREA BANKS. 5TH (BOTTOM LINE) and 95TH (TOP LINE) PERCENTILES
-
+
C
o
n
t
r
i
b
u
t
i
o
n
-0.4
-0.3
-0.2
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18
-3
-2
-1
0
Jan-18 Apr-18 Jul-18 Oct-18
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 58 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2018
mid-2016 has held at very low levels and has continued to fall in the past six months 
(see Chart 2.18.A). Similarly, the Spanish interbank market continues to post very low 
volumes of activity. 
The low EONIA trading volume means that the index will no longer meet the criteria of 
Regulation (EU) 2016/1011 of 8 June 2016 on benchmarks and may not be used as from 
1 January 2020 as a benchmark index for trading in financial instruments, loan or mortgage 
agreements, or to measure the profitability of investment funds. For this reason, starting in 
October 2019, the ECB shall publish an alternative interest rate known as the “ESTER” 
(euro short-term rate). Both indices are based on unsecured transactions, but differ in 
important ways. The ESTER will be calculated using individual unsecured overnight 
deposit transactions on the European money market that 52 banks must report to the ECB 
in accordance with the money market statistical reporting (MMSR) regulation, while the 
EONIA is computed as a weighted average of all overnight unsecured lending interbank 
transactions submitted in the form of voluntary contributions by a panel of banks.
In recent years, the Eurosystem has substantially increased its funding to banks, while 
interbank market trading has been limited. At the date of this report going to press 
Interbank market activity  
in the euro area remains very 
low, as a result of which the 
EONIA index will be replaced 
by the euro short-term rate 
(ESTER) from October 2019
SOURCES: Bloomberg, Dealogic and Banco de España.
a Includes covered bonds, senior debt, subordinated debt tier 2 and additional tier 1 issues. Retained issues are not included.
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(October 2018), the Eurosystem had provided liquidity amounting to €3,363 billion 
through asset purchase programmes (€2,630 billion) and refinancing operations (€733 
billion), generating a high level of surplus liquidity of €1,870 billion in October 2018. 
Chart 2.18.B shows the developments relating to these forms of Eurosystem liquidity 
provision.
The Eurosystem’s refinancing operations have remained stable since March 2017. They 
relate to a series of four extraordinary targeted longer-term operations with a four-year 
maturity, known as TLTRO II, and amounting to €725 billion. They were issued quarterly 
between June 2016 and March 2017 at an interest rate which could be as low as the 
deposit facility rate (–0.4%). The final rate depends, for each bank, on the behaviour of the 
volume of its portfolio of loans to firms and households, excluding those for house 
purchase, between February 2016 and 31 January 2018. The maximum rate applicable is 
that of main refinancing operations (0%). These operations have provided banks with 
stable, long-term funding with highly favourable conditions. 
Spanish banks have continued to have considerable recourse to Eurosystem funds and to 
show limited interbank activity. The liabilities of Spanish banks vis-à-vis the Eurosystem 
practically all derive from TLTRO II operations and have remained broadly unchanged 
since end-March 2017, at around €168 billion. This amount represents 22% of the total 
liquidity received by all Eurosystem banks (see Chart 2.18.C) and slightly more than 15% 
of Spain’s GDP. The TLTRO-II operations will mature between June 2020 and March 2021, 
although banks may make partial or total early repayments on a quarterly basis as from 
June 2018, provided that at least two years have elapsed since the funds were granted.3 
Banks must address these maturities either through the divestment of liquid assets 
(including the reserves with the central bank) or refinancing on the financial markets or with 
Eurosystem funding. 
Regular one-week and three-month lending operations will continue to be executed at a 
fixed rate with full allotment of banks’ requests for liquidity, only subject to having sufficient 
collateral, at least until the end of the last reserve maintenance period of 2019. Banks are 
thus assured of an ample period of time during which they will receive all the liquidity they 
request.
With regard to long-term funding, Spanish banks reduced their issuance activity in the first 
three quarters of 2018 compared with the same period of 2017 (see Chart 2.18.D). As 
regards the instruments issued, only covered bonds increased relative to the previous year 
(which had seen a significant decrease compared with the amounts issued in 2016). Senior 
debt issuance decreased relative to 2017, when issues of this type of debt had grown 
significantly, as Spanish banks began to issue senior non-preferred debt (a type of 
instrument that they can use to meet MREL requirements). Finally, the issuance of debt 
eligible as additional Tier 1 capital decreased with respect to 2017, whereas the issues of 
debt eligible as Tier 2 capital remained relatively stable.
At consolidated level, for Spanish deposit institutions overall, Chart 2.19 shows the 
diverging developments in total deposits in Spain, which fell by 1.3% year-on-year relative 
to the same month of the previous year, while deposits abroad grew by 2.5%. Thus, 
deposits abroad, as a proportion of the total, increased to 40.1% in June 2018. However, 
private-sector deposits on the consolidated balance sheet of Spanish deposit institutions 
3  On 27 June loans amounting to some €11 billion were repaid early by 41 counterparty institutions in the euro area.
The Spanish banking sector 
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grew by 0.6% year-on-year to €1,972 billion in June 2018 (see Annex 1). This increase was 
due to the year-on-year growth of 2% in deposits of the resident private sector in Spain, 
while deposits abroad fell by 1.6% (partly as a result of a widespread appreciation of the 
euro exchange rate against other currencies).
Chart 2.20.A shows the geographical breakdown of deposits abroad of Spanish banks 
with significant international exposure. As the graph shows, the activity abroad of Spanish 
banks is concentrated mainly in five countries which account for nearly 65% of deposits 
abroad: United Kingdom (28.1%), United States (12.9%), Mexico (9.4%), Brazil (8.3%) and 
Portugal (6.1%).
Chart 2.20.B also shows, for the main emerging countries in which Spanish banks are 
present, the geographical breakdown of deposits which, generally speaking, come mainly 
from household and non-financial corporations. Notable in Chile is the importance of 
funding received from non-financial corporations (more than 50% of the total), while in 
Turkey, Poland and Argentina, funding from households exceeded 50% of total funding. 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
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In Mexico and Peru, the proportions of funding from households and from non-financial 
corporations are more even. Lastly, in Brazil and Colombia, funding from credit institutions 
and general government, respectively, plays a significant role.
Deposits taken from the resident private sector (restricting analysis to households and non-
financial corporations) by deposit institutions in Spain, analysed using the data from individual 
financial statements, grew by 3.9% in the year. This rate is somewhat higher than that 
observed 12 months earlier (2.7%) and, continues the upward trend that began in mid-2015. 
The yield on deposits from households and non-financial corporations has steadied in the 
past 12 months, in line with the stabilisation of the decline of the Euribor (see Chart 2.21.A). 
Nevertheless, owing to the low yields, sight deposits have continued to increase at the 
expense of time deposits, as has been observed in recent years, so that time deposits have 
decreased from 53.4% of total deposits in December 2013 to 19.6% in June 2018. 
Owing to the downward trend in lending, which was more marked in this period as a result 
of developments in the construction and real estate sectors, and the opposite trend in the 
volume of deposits, the loan-deposit ratio has continued to move on the declining course 
of recent years. This ratio is already less than half of its value in October 2007, when the 
peak of the whole series was recorded (see Chart 2.21.B).
Retail deposits from  
non-financial corporations  
and households increased  
in the period, while  
a stabilising trend was  
observed in interest rates…
…, which, along with  
the fall in lending, led  
to a further decline in  
the loan-to-deposit ratio  
of these sectors
SOURCES: CNMV and Banco de España.
a Loans to households and non-financial corporations net of provisions. Deposits from households and non-financial corporations plus debt securities of deposit 
instituions held by households and non-financial corporations.
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The net assets of investment funds continued their upward trend initiated at the end of 2012, 
against a background of low interest rates and low returns on assets (see Chart 2.21.C). 
In July 2018, the total net assets of investment funds amounted to almost €275 billion, 
having increased by more than €11 billion in the year so far. Net subscriptions rose in all 
months of the year, while the returns on investment funds performed less evenly, with 
positive contributions (three months of the year) and turning negative (four months), as 
shown in Chart 2.21.D.
In the first half of 2018, Spanish deposit institutions as a whole recorded consolidated 
profit attributable to the parent of slightly more than €10,000 million. This amount represents 
growth of 12.5% with respect to the profit for the first half of 2017 (see Annex 2). The 
higher profit reflected growth of 7 bp in the return on assets (ROA) of the Spanish banking 
sector, from 0.50% at June 2017 to 0.57% at June 2018. Along these same lines, the 
return on equity (ROE) grew by 0.5 pp from 7.1% at June 2017 to 7.6% at June 2018.
Following the trend of the last few years, the main determinant of this improvement in profit 
was the year-on-year decrease in impairment losses, which fell by 18.1% in the past year. 
At the top of the income statement, net interest income increased slightly (0.1%), but the 
fall of 1.7% in average total assets from June 2017 to June 2018 meant that its contribution 
to the return on average total assets (ATA) rose by 3 bp, as shown by Chart 2.22.A. 
In the current low interest rate environment, banks have focused somewhat more on the 
provision of banking services, with the result that fees and commissions increased by 
2.3% in the past year (see Annex 2). In keeping with the pattern of recent years, gains on 
financial assets and liabilities expressed as a proportion of ATA decreased by 4 bp to 
0.16%. As a result of these developments, gross income fell slightly by 1.8% from June 
2017 to June 2018. Operating expenses at consolidated level increased by 0.4%, so net 
operating income fell proportionately more than gross income, being down by 3.9% 
year-on-year. Finally, as shown by Chart 2.22.B, impairment losses fell notably in the 
past year, in line with the trend of the last six years, and their weight in average total 
assets dropped to 0.41%.
2.2 Profitability
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Using European Banking Authority data as at June 2018,4 Chart 2.23 presents a European 
comparison of three profitability measures at consolidated level: return on equity, return on 
assets and cost-to-income ratio. Charts 2.23.A and 2.23.B show that the ROE and the 
ROA of the Spanish banking system are above the European averages and those of the 
main European countries. Finally, Chart 2.23.C shows that the cost-to-income ratio of 
Spanish banks is one of the lowest (i.e. best) in Europe.
4 See http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/risk-dashboard
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In the first half of 2018, the profitability of business in Spain, analysed through the individual 
financial statements reported by banks, was somewhat lower than that of overall 
consolidated operations. Compared with the first half of 2017, the return on assets 
increased slightly from 0.53% at June 2017 to 0.55% at June 2018, and the same was so 
for the return on equity, up from 5.9% at June 2017 to 6.2% at June 2018. As in overall 
consolidated activity, the main determinant of this year-on-year improvement was the 
significant reduction in impairment losses, which fell by nearly 47% in the past year.
Chart 2.24.A shows a further fall in net interest income due to the fact that interest 
revenue decreased by more than interest expenses. This continued fall was offset 
because banks switched a portion of their business to the provision of services which 
generated fees and commissions. Thus Chart 2.24.B shows the increase in net fees and 
commissions in the past two years, both in absolute amount and as a proportion of 
gross income.
Analysis by type of fees/commissions shows that the main ones are those associated with 
the sale of financial products and those derived from payment services, which together 
represent nearly 70% of net fees and commissions at June 2018 (see Chart 2.24.C). They 
are followed by fees/commissions for securities services, which represent more than 11%, 
and those associated with financial guarantees (less than 4%) and with loan commitments 
(less then 3%), while other fees/commissions account for nearly 13%.
The profitability of business  
in Spain improved slightly with 
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In 2018 the number of staff and branches continue to decrease, with year-on-year falls of 
around 3% and 4%, respectively. The process of capacity adjustment of the Spanish banking 
system has now been going on for 10 years, and the reduction of branches with respect 
to the peak in 2008 exceeds 40%, while that of staff exceeds 32% (see Chart 2.24.D). 
The ongoing pressure on margins means that banks need to continue adjusting their 
operating expenses by harnessing technological advances in the distribution of financial 
products, without neglecting the new risks (operational, cybersecurity, legal, etc.) which 
this may involve.
The pressure on profitability and the other risks mentioned in Chapter 1 help to explain the 
stock market performance of European banks in 2018 so far. For nearly all the first half of 
the year, European bank share prices – except in Germany where they have fallen over the 
whole year and in Italy where they rose in the first few months of the year – held fairly 
steady. However, from mid-May European bank share prices, particularly in Italy, began to 
fall and have held on a downward trend since then (see Chart 2.25.A). As a result of this 
behaviour, bank share prices in the main European countries have fallen between 24% and 
26% in the year so far and those of German banks have slumped by more than 40%. 
Spanish banks have followed this same trend and have fallen by 24% between 1 January 
and 30 October 2018. These share price falls reduce the price-to-book value of the 
European banking systems. As far as this metric is concerned, the Spanish banking sector 
is in line with the European average, although above the average of the euro area and of 
such countries as France and Italy, and, particularly, Germany (see Chart 2.25.B).
With very low interest rates and narrow margins, Spanish banks have continued to improve 
the bottom line of their income statements (basically due to the reduction of impairment 
losses). This recovery of profitability enables banks to assign more funds to strengthening 
solvency levels and bring them nearer to the levels of banks in the other euro area countries, 
a circumstance which is analysed below.
In June 2018 the CET1 ratio, which measures the highest quality capital, stood at 11.9%, 
the same level as the previous year (see Chart 2.26). Although the level of the ratio did 
not change from June 2017 to June 2018, its numerator (CET1) and denominator (RWAs) 
did change. Both decreased in the past year in the same proportion, namely 5.5% (see 
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Chart 2.27.A). The decrease in CET1 is due largely to lower transitional adjustments,5 
which decreased by nearly 60% from June 2017 to June 2018 due to the approach of the 
period of full implementation of Basel III. The main transitional adjustments were 
deductions of intangible assets, which have been eliminated in 2018. The main 
transitional adjustments remaining which relate to Basel III are deductions of deferred 
tax assets that rely on future profitability (€3.2 billion). Also, 2018 saw the introduction of 
transitional adjustments derived from the mechanism of progressive adaptation of the 
impact of IFRS 9 on capital ratios (amounting to nearly €4 billion at June 2018), the 
phase-in schedule for which has a duration of five years.
Over a longer timeframe, from June 2014, the first year in which the prudential standards 
known as Basel III were applied upon the entry into force of CRD IV/CRR (particularly the 
introduction of CET1), common equity Tier 1 ratio has increased by 0.3 pp. By contrast, 
the other two capital ratios, i.e. total capital and Tier 1 capital, have increased to a much 
greater extent: 1.7 pp and 1.6 pp, respectively (see Chart 2.26). And in the past year both 
ratios have also increased: the total capital ratio by 0.7 pp to 15.1% and the Tier 1 capital 
ratio by 0.8 pp to 13.2%.
The significant decrease in transitional adjustments as banks fully converge on the new 
definition of capital has prompted a reshuffling of the composition of own funds, in which 
common equity Tier 1 has decreased and additional Tier 1 capital has increased (and thus 
the difference between CET1 and Tier 1 capital has widened). Hence common equity Tier 
1 capital represents 78.5% of own funds at June 2018 (compared with 82.2% a year 
earlier), and additional Tier 1 capital represents 8.8% of own funds (compared with 3.4% 
a year earlier). Meanwhile, Tier 2 capital has decreased somewhat and its relative weight 
is 12.7% of own funds (compared with 14.4% a year earlier).
Chart 2.27.C allows us to examine in greater detail the composition of common equity Tier 
1 in terms of risk-weighted assets. Equity instruments make up most of the eligible 
elements of CET1, accounting for 56% of them (nearly 9 pp of the CET1 ratio). Reserves 
constitute 35% of the eligible elements (5.7 pp of the ratio), such that capital and reserves 
5  Transitional adjustments generally defer over time the deductions from own funds set out in Directive 2013/36/
EU of 26 June 2013 (CRD IV) and in Regulation (EU) 575/2013 of 26 June 2013 (CRR), which implement Basel III 
in Europe such that the reduction of CET1 is spread over more years. Broadly speaking, the transitional ad-
justment was 80% in 2014, 60% in 2015, 40% in 2016, 20% in 2017, and disappears in 2018.
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represent 91% of the eligible elements of CET1 (14.7 pp of the ratio). Minority interests 
have a relative weight of 6% (1 pp of the ratio) and, finally, the aforementioned reduction 
of transitional adjustments caused their weight in the eligible elements of CET1 to drop 
below 3% (compared with, for example, 20% at June 2014). As for deductions (4.2 pp of 
the ratio), those derived from goodwill and other intangible assets account for nearly three-
quarters of them (3.1 pp of the ratio).
Finally, as regards the composition of the denominator of the ratios, i.e. risk weighted 
assets, its structure remains the same as in previous years. Thus, credit and counterparty 
risk account for most of RWAs, namely 87%, operational risk for 9%, and position, 
exchange and commodity risk (different manifestations of market risk) and other risks 
account for less than 5% of the RWAs of the Spanish banking sector (see Chart 2.27.D).
Chart 2.28.A is a European comparison of the common equity Tier 1 ratio using figures of 
the banks which reported COREP data to the European Banking Authority as at June 
2018.6 As seen in the chart, the European comparison of capital ratios shows that Spanish 
banks have low CET1 and Tier 1 capital ratios (see Chart 2.28.B) and low total capital 
ratios (see Chart 2.28.C). However, in terms of the leverage ratio (see Chart 2.28.D), the 
position is less unfavourable compared with other large European countries due to the 
6 See http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/risk-dashboard
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higher densities of RWAs in Spain, or, in other words, the higher ratio of RWAs to total 
exposures or of average risk exposure to unadjusted exposure in absolute terms.
Chart 2.29.A shows the historical development of the capital ratios of Spanish banks. 
Chart 2.29.A, which sets out the yearly changes in the total and Tier 1 capital ratios from 
June 2008, shows that the Tier 1 capital ratio has grown in the whole period except 2012 
when the sector incurred significant losses. For its part, the total capital ratio has also 
grown from 2012, whereas before then it had remained relatively steady.
The analysis of the common equity tier 1 capital ratio is limited to the period 2014-2018 
because, as noted above, this highest-level capital was instituted by the Basel III 
prudential standards which began to be applied in March 2014. Chart 2.29.B shows how 
the CET1 ratio practically did not increase in value with respect to 2014. Moreover, this 
increase of 30 bp in the ratio did not take place as a result of the effect of an increase in 
eligible capital, but rather because of a decrease in risk-weighted assets (denominator 
of the ratio). 
Chart 2.29.C gives a breakdown of the 30 bp change in the CET1 ratio from 11.6% at 
June 2014 to 11.9% at June 2018. In this period, capital and reserves eligible as CET1 
increased by a little more than 2 pp of RWAs. There was little change in the contribution 
to the ratio made by minority interests and by deductions for goodwill and other intangible 
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assets and for deferred tax assets, while the contribution made by other deductions 
increased by 1.3 pp of RWAs. The increases in the ratio derived from capital, reserves and 
other deductions are largely offset by the decrease in transitional adjustments of nearly 3 
pp of the ratio, which kick in as the effect of the entry into force of Basel III progressively 
impacts on CET1, finally resulting in the aforementioned 30 bp increase in the CET1 ratio 
in the last four years.
Broadly it can be said that, compared with other European banks, the capital ratio position 
of Spanish deposit institutions partly reflects the intense balance sheet clean-up carried 
out by them and the greater density of their risk-weighted assets. Additionally, the market 
indicators (price to book value) of Spanish banks, when compared with those of the large 
euro area countries, are relatively higher (see Chart 2.25.B). However, banks should adopt 
strategies to strengthen their capital as it must not be forgotten that a bank’s solvency is 
the basic pillar supporting its loss-absorbing capacity in the event of unforeseen losses 
materialising as a result of the risks (credit, market, operational, legal, etc.) affecting the 
Spanish and other European banking systems. Furthermore, it is a key indicator for the 
market to assess the soundness of and confidence in a bank or banking system in general. 
Also, a comfortable solvency level allows a bank to respond without delay to a possible 
upturn in the demand for credit, which in turn contributes to strengthening economic 
growth and the financial position of banks.
Additionally, it should be kept in mind that the minimum requirement for own funds and 
eligible liabilities (MREL) which the Single Resolution Board (SRB) has begun to set for 
European significant institutions is an additional reason for Spanish banks to strengthen 
their capital in the current environment, in which profitability, although influenced by 
interest rate and deleveraging issues, continues to recover and in which the economy is 
growing at a significant pace. For more details on the MREL, see Box 2.4.
The Banco de España has been conducting yearly since 2013 tests of the Spanish banking 
system’s resilience using an analysis framework known as FLESB (Forward Looking 
Exercise on Spanish Banks). The FLESB framework is a proprietary tool of the Banco de 
España, which centres its analysis on Spanish banks’ resilience, measured in terms of 
solvency and liquidity, under different macroeconomic scenarios. The tool features a top-
down approach, homogeneous methodological assumptions defined by the national 
regulator and the use of highly granular data.
The Banco de España has introduced continual improvements in the methodology used, 
the main calculation methods and the scope of the risks addressed, including notably in 
2017 the introduction for the first time of an analysis of each bank’s liquidity position. This 
year the entry into force on 1 January 2018 of the new accounting rules International 
Financial Reporting Standard 9 (IFRS 9) and Banco de España Circular 4/2017 have 
marked a change in the basic methodologies used to calculate credit risk losses and 
prompted a review of the treatment of this risk within the FLESB framework. In particular, 
the credit category Stage2, S2, that which includes those performing financial instruments 
that have had a significant increase in credit risk, was added to the existing ones of 
“performing” (Stage 1, S1) and “non-performing” (Stage 3, S3). Also, the expected losses 
relating to this category, S2, are calculated for the whole life of the exposure (using a 
lifetime probability of default) rather than just for the twelve months used for performing 
exposures. Also incorporated is a model of the transition of exposures among these three 
stages for the whole time horizon of the exercise.
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European banking union has so far led to the launch of the SSM 
(Single Supervisory Mechanism) and of the SRB (Single Resolution 
Board), the latter entrusted with preparing the resolution of 
European significant institutions. This preparation includes the 
formulation of resolution plans, analysis of resolvability and the 
imposition of minimum requirements for own funds and eligible 
liabilities (MRELs) so as to comply with the paradigm change 
instituted at international level as a result of the past banking crisis. 
This paradigm change in the resolution of financial institutions 
consists of the replacement of bail-outs (bank rescue or 
recapitalisation using public funds) with bail-ins (bank rescue using 
private funds from the bank itself). 
Despite the efforts made by the SRB since its creation to advance 
in the construction of the resolution arm of banking union, some 
uncertainties remain which relate in part to the current debate over 
the new European resolution directive (known as BRRD2). These 
rules may affect the MREL in matters such as calibration, 
subordination, transitional periods for effective compliance, etc. 
So far the SRB is not taking into account these changes in the 
development of its internal policies since they do not yet have the 
status of approved rules. 
At the beginning of 2018, the SRB set for the first time binding 
consolidated-level MREL targets by resolution group for those 
Spanish banks with resolution colleges (because they have 
banking activity both in the banking union and outside it but in the 
European Union). The requirements were based on the 
methodology approved by the SRB to calculate MRELs for the 
bail-in resolution tool.1 
This year the SRB plans to set binding targets at consolidated level 
for the rest of the Spanish banks within its area of competence. For 
this purpose, in the current year the SRB has developed an internal 
MREL calibration methodology for tools other than bail-in. This 
methodology is of a transitional nature and has yet to be 
communicated to banks. This is of particular importance for 
Spanish significant institutions because the preferred tool of some 
of them is sale of business. 
For larger banks, the current MREL calculation methodology for 
the bail-in tool does not entail foreseeable major difficulties in 
meeting the MREL target at consolidated level, as was publicly 
announced by the banks themselves following the communication 
of the binding target early this year. 
The situation for medium-sized banks is not so clear. The 
calculation methodology for banks with a resolution strategy 
other than bail-in, which is transitional and only intended to be 
used while a final methodology adapted to each bank is being 
designed, may lead to MRELs not much lower than those 
which would result from use of the calibration stipulated in the 
bail-in tool.2 
These banks, in the Spanish case, have an essentially retail business 
model, particularly on the liabilities side, where the taking of 
deposits from natural persons and SMEs has a high relative 
importance in their funding structure. This focus, which generally 
affords greater stability to a bank’s liabilities, does however lower 
the MREL target because these deposits do not have the status of 
eligible instruments for determining compliance. Moreover, business 
model, with liabilities basically consisting of retail deposits and 
capital means that their experience as issuers centres basically on 
the equity markets. They therefore have a limited investor base and 
potential difficulties in accessing the (preferred and non-preferred) 
debt markets. The size of these banks, which is relatively small on a 
worldwide or European scale, is an additional problem when it 
comes to attracting a wide investor base. 
Finally, the issuance of instruments of this type will foreseeably 
have a much greater impact on the interest spread of medium-
sized Spanish banks than on that of large banks. This is due to the 
aforementioned difficulties of market access and to the low 
volume, in absolute terms, of the issues placed by medium-sized 
banks. The smaller the total amount of a bank’s outstanding debt, 
the smaller its liquidity, and, consequently, the larger the premium 
required by investors. 
In view of all the above, given the regulatory uncertainty that exists, 
it will be necessary to press ahead in the definition of calculation 
methodologies which take into account the special features of 
each bank as regards risk profile, funding model, size and market 
access in order to align MRELs with banks’ business models.
Spanish banks have already begun to strengthen their MREL 
levels, making limited use of senior non-preferred debt and with a 
clear predominance of issues by larger banks. Furthermore, 
placement prices vary greatly, with cost differences between 
medium-sized and large banks which exceed, for example, 5 pp in 
AT1 instruments. 
In the case of less significant institutions (LSIs), the difficulties are 
similar or even greater than for medium-sized significant institutions, 
although in this case the Banco de España will be responsible for 
calibrating the MREL level to be met by these banks once the 
methodology has been clearly defined at European level. 
In summary, the paradigm change in the resolution of deposit 
institutions from bail-out to bail-in will give rise to not insignificant 
1  In addition to bail-in, the rules envisage another three resolution tools: 
sale of business, bridge banks and asset management vehicles. In 
principle, none of the four tools is given priority over the others. 
2  It should be noted that in open bank bail-in the post-resolution bank 
must be recapitalised using funds of the bank itself, while in the case of 
a sale of business, the funds for the recapitalisation must be provided in 
full or in part by the purchaser, as has occurred recently.
MREL (MINIMUM REqUIREMENT FOR OWN FUNDS AND ELIGIBLE LIABILITIES) BOX 2.4
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Scenarios used: solvency and liquidity
In this exercise, the FLESB solvency analysis was conducted using the macroeconomic 
scenarios designed for the stress test coordinated by the EBA at European level.7 The 
baseline scenario includes the most likely changes in the economic environment over the 
three years of the exercise from 2018 to 2020, while the adverse scenario assumes the 
materialisation of the main risks to the European economy identified by the ESRB. In 
particular, the scenario assumes a sharp repricing of risk premia on the global markets 
with an impact on multiple assets: an increase in the level and slope of the US interest rate 
curve and a global shock to the equity markets. This repricing and the consequent 
worsening of financial conditions prompt a global recession, Europe included. Other risks 
materialised in this adverse scenario include feedback between low bank profitability and 
weak economic activity, activated by the recession of the scenario, and excessive public 
and private debt and a lack of liquidity of non-bank financial institutions.8 It should be 
emphasised that the adverse scenario does not reflect national or European authorities’ 
expectations regarding macroeconomic behaviour, but rather hypothetical conditions 
used to assess the resilience of banks to extreme and unlikely conditions. 
Chart 2.30.A compares GDP growth in Spain over the time horizon of the exercise under 
the baseline and adverse scenarios. In the first two years, 2018 and 2019, the adverse 
scenario shows negative GDP growth of –0.3% and –1.5%, respectively, and only in the 
last year does it show moderate positive growth of 1.1%. The adverse scenario thus shows 
a cumulative decrease of –0.7% compared with the baseline scenario which gives 
cumulative growth of 6.7% in the three years. 
The scenario of the EBA exercise includes a broad set of variables in addition to GDP 
growth (unemployment rate, interest rates, etc.) which are also used in the FLESB exercise 
and determine the severity of the scenario, which is not summarised in a single variable. 
Charts 2.30.B to 2.30.D show the behaviour of other key variables under the two scenarios 
considered. Most notable is the severity of the house price slump under the most adverse 
assumptions. The baseline scenario gives cumulative house price growth of 15.5%, while 
the adverse scenario shows slight growth in the first year and sharp falls in the next two 
years, with a cumulative decline of –14.4%.
7  Although the scenarios used by the FLESB are the same as those used by the EBA in the exercise conducted at 
European level, the assumptions, methodology, estimation of parameters and scope of application (institutions 
stressed and risks analysed) differ, so the results of the two exercises are not directly comparable and hence 
there are differences between them.
8  It is interesting to note that although the adverse scenario was defined at the beginning of this year, to some 
extent it factors in the risks identified in the summary of this FSR. Specifically, repricing risk (rising interest rates) 
and the potential negative impact of the emerging economies.
The baseline scenario  
reflects the central 
expectations for 2018-2020 
while the adverse scenario 
assumes a sharp repricing  
of financial assets and a fall  
in overall economic growth
The adverse scenario 
assumes a recessionary 
tendency in Spain in 2018  
and 2019, recovery in 2020 
and a cumulative fall in  
GDP of –0.7%
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BOX 2.4MREL (MINIMUM REqUIREMENT FOR OWN FUNDS AND ELIGIBLE LIABILITIES) (cont´d)
elements needed to operate in the new regulatory environment. 
Since the MREL includes not only liabilities but also own funds 
(capital and reserves), any improvement in the volume of the latter 
held by a bank will also contribute to meeting the MREL target.
MRELs in the coming years. The progressive improvement in 
Spanish bank profitability against a background of sustained 
economic expansion and relatively low funding costs should allow 
Spanish deposit institutions to gradually build up the MREL 
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The impact of these scenarios on the balance sheet and business of banks is projected 
through the use of various ancillary models (e.g. by calculation of expected losses due to 
credit risk over the 2018-2020 time horizon). Solvency at the end-date of the exercise is 
determined by the bank’s capacity to absorb losses through elements such as previously 
recorded provisions, the pre-provision profit generated within the analysis time horizon 
and the capital held in excess of minimum regulatory capital.
The analysis of each bank’s liquidity position within the FLESB framework is based on the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR). To carry out this analysis, the baseline scenario uses the 
regulatory coefficients for 30-day fund outflows set by the Basel Committee and the EBA. 
The adverse scenario is calibrated by the Banco de España on the basis of its past 
experience of fund outflows observed in previous liquidity crises. Chart 2.31 shows the 
main coefficients applied as a result of the defined scenarios.
Results yielded by the FLESB methodology: Solvency
The 57 banks that take part in the exercise are divided into three groups based on size and 
international presence. The heterogeneity of the Spanish banking system makes this 
classification necessary in order to reflect the differences in the sources of risk to which 
the various banks are exposed. This classification coincides with that used last year in the 
forward-looking exercise to assess the resilience of the Spanish banking system.9 
9  See Financial Stability Report, Banco de España, November 2017, page 66. https://www.bde.es/f/webbde/Sec-
ciones/Publicaciones/InformesBoletinesRevistas/InformesEstabilidadFinancera/17/IEF_Noviembre2017Ing.pdf
The adverse scenario  
for the liquidity exercise 
assumes significant outflows 
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and wholesale sectors
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The first group consists of the Spanish banks forming part of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) with significant international activity,10 the second group consists of the 
other significant Spanish banks in the SSM and the third group comprises other (less 
significant) banks of lower complexity and smaller size, which are supervised directly by 
the Banco de España. Reported here for each group is the CET1 Fully Loaded (FL)11 capital 
ratio in the starting year, December 2017, and the impact of the baseline scenario and the 
adverse scenario in the three years of the exercise, showing the ratio at the end of the time 
horizon, December 2020. Details are given of the effect of the gross credit losses and of 
the use of existing provisions, in both cases referring to business in Spain and expressed 
as a percentage of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) in 2017. Also, the cumulative effect of the 
estimated results12 (on RWAs in 2017) is separated from the other impacts on CET1 (tax 
effects, changes in RWAs, distribution of profit, etc.). 
First, the group of institutions with significant international activity is considered. For all 
these banks, their business in Spain is analysed by, among other things, calculating the 
expected losses on individual exposures, on the basis of the highly granular data available. 
Additionally, for this first group of banks, business abroad, for which the available data are 
less granular, is also considered. The analysis thus focuses on the income statement 
projections and, in particular, on the net profit attributable at each of the main foreign 
subsidiaries. These projections are conditional on the international macroeconomic 
scenarios of the EBA’s European exercise. 
Chart 2.32 shows the results for this group of banks with significant international activity. 
For the baseline scenario, there is a significant improvement in the solvency of banks of 
this type, whose CET1 ratio increases by 3 pp from 11.1% to 14.1% at the end of the time 
10  The composition of this group of three banks remains unchanged from the previous FLESB exercise. A bank 
in this group enlarged its perimeter significantly in 2017 through a corporate transaction. Two banks in the 
group of other Spanish banks in the SSM increased their international activity in 2017, but their volume of 
business is not comparable to that of the three banks in the first group and they therefore remain classified 
outside this group.
11  The fully loaded CET1 is calculated as the sum of all eligible capital elements at a given date less the full 
regulatory deductions, disregarding the reduction of deductions according to the progressive implementation 
(phase-in) schedule.
12  Estimated results include both the net income before provisions of business in Spain and the contribution by 
group subsidiaries to the net profit attributable to the parent company.
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horizon of the exercise. The volume of gross losses in Spain (5.7% of RWAs) is practically 
offset by a notable generation of profits (5.6% of RWAs). 
For the adverse scenario, the CET1 ratio of these banks decreases by 1 pp to 10.1% in 
2020. The worse macroeconomic conditions under this scenario prompt higher losses 
(8.4%), which cannot be absorbed by provisions and attributable profit. The generation of 
profits decreases by approximately 35% compared with the baseline scenario.
The results of the other banks directly supervised by the SSM (nine banks) are shown in 
Chart 2.33. For the baseline scenario, CET1 improved more moderately, by 1.4 pp, than 
at banks with significant international activity. Although they start from more favourable 
solvency position, with a CET1 ratio of 12.2%, their ratio in 2020 is somewhat lower than 
that of the banks in the first group. This is because the volume of losses is higher (9.5% 
of RWAs, 3.8 pp more than in the first group) and the generation of profits is moderate 
(4.8% of RWAs, 0.8 pp below that of the first group), and these factors cannot be offset 
by a use of provisions which is 2.1 pp higher than in the group of banks with significant 
international activity.
The FL CET1 ratio of the other 
banks supervised by the SSM 
increases by 1.4 pp in the 
baseline scenario, while it 
decreases by 4.5 pp in the 
adverse scenario
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Under the adverse scenario there is a very considerable increase in the volume of losses 
in this group (15.1% of RWAs). Moreover, the available loss-absorbing elements are not 
sufficient to cover them: use of provisions (6.9% of RWAs) and earnings (3.9% of RWAs) 
against a background of low interest rates and significant pressure on margins. The high 
volume of losses is largely attributable to the notable fall in real estate prices for banks 
which have all their risk exposure in Spain and have a high volume of collateral, either as 
foreclosed assets or as loan collateral. The CET1 ratio stands at 7.7% at the end of the 
time horizon of the exercise, which is a significant fall of 4.5 pp. 
Finally, Chart 2.34 shows the impact of the scenarios on the solvency of banks in the last 
group, i.e. less significant institutions subject to direct national supervision. These banks 
start from a CET1 ratio of 16.8% in December 2017, the highest of the three groups analysed, 
and under the baseline scenario it increases, similarly to that of the SSM banks without 
significant international activity, by 1.1 pp. The volume of losses (6.8% of RWAs) is offset by 
the use of provisions (5.1% of RWAs) and by the generation of profit (4.3% of RWAs).
Under the adverse scenario, the volume of losses of less significant institutions increases 
by 4.4 pp with respect to the baseline scenario, reaching 11.2% of RWAs. These losses 
exceed the total volume of items available to absorb them (provisions and profits), giving 
rise to a moderate fall in the CET1 ratio (2.2 pp), which at the end of the time horizon of the 
exercise in December 2020 stands at 14.6%.
Based on the ending CET1 ratios, the foregoing results show that in aggregate terms 
Spanish deposit institutions have a high resilience to an adverse scenario. However, the 
unevenness of results across banks and the possibility that the risks which materialise 
may exceed those envisaged under the adverse scenario, make it advisable for banks to 
strengthen their capital insofar as the observed recovery of profits allows.
Results yielded by the FLESB methodology: Liquidity
The LCR ratio measures whether unencumbered high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) are 
sufficient to cover funding needs in 30 natural days in the event of liquidity problems. The 
reference date in this exercise is December 2017 and the analysis time horizon, in keeping 
with the definition of the LCR ratio, is the 30 days following that date. The starting 
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coefficients for the aforementioned baseline and adverse scenarios are applied to this 
analysis time horizon (see Chart 2.31).
Chart 2.35 shows the results obtained from this analysis and indicates that the liquidity 
position of Spanish banks is robust, since all the banking groups exceed the minimum 
LCR requirements set for 2018 (100%) under both scenarios. Particularly notable is the 
liquidity position of the less significant institutions, which even under the adverse 
scenario have a ratio of approximately 380%.
The results of the biennial resilience test using EBA methodology were published on 2 
November. Specifically, the stress test covers 48 banks from the European Union (EU) 
and the European Economic Area (EEA), accounting for around 70% of total EU 
banking assets.
Under the baseline scenario, for all the participating institutions, the CET1 capital ratio 
would increase, rising from 14.2% (fully loaded as at end-2017) to 15.3% in 2020 (an 
increase of 1.1 pp). As to the Spanish institutions participating in this test,13 under this 
scenario they would post an increase on a greater scale (2.3 pp) in their capital ratio, 
rising from a ratio of 11.1% (fully loaded as at December 2017) to a ratio of 13.4% in 
2020, at the end of the exercise (see Chart 2.36.A).
Under the adverse scenario, the European institutions would, overall, see a reduction of 
4.2 pp in their capital ratio at the end of the year, placing it at 10.1% of risk-weighted 
assets. In the case of the Spanish banks the reduction is less, at 2.2 pp, down to a value 
of 8.9% (see Chart 26.B). Thus, Spanish banks, despite starting from a lower capital ratio 
than their European counterparts (11.1% against 14.2%), show greater resilience to the 
adverse scenario, which reflects the risks, at the current juncture, that are considered most 
relevant in respect of global financial stability. 
On conducting the analysis at country level, it can be seen (Chart 2.37) that the Spanish 
banks (along with those of Norway and Poland) are part of the group for which the 
13 Banco Santander SA, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA, CaixaBank SA and Banco Sabadell SA.
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impact on the capital ratio is lower. At the opposite extreme are the UK banks, which 
show an impact of more than 6 pp in terms of the reduction in their CET1 capital ratio at 
the end of the year. 
The methodology used by the EBA, the scope of the exercise and the risks analysed differ 
from those used by the FLESB. Accordingly, the results obtained are different. In any 
event, both exercises highlight the considerable resilience of Spanish banks to an adverse 
economic environment.
SOURCE: EBA.
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3 MACROPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS AND POLICY
The map of indicators of systemic vulnerabilities, which is regularly published in this chapter, 
summarises information from over one hundred indicators of potential risk to the financial 
system and actual conditions in the real economy and in the banking sector in Spain.1 
These indicators have been selected as predictors of bank crises to anticipate identifying 
medium/long-term vulnerabilities, which is particularly useful for shaping the macroprudential 
policy stance steering the activation of macroprudential instruments, especially those that 
most closely affect the credit cycle.2
The update of this map as at June 2018 shows that the indicators of credit, liquidity, 
concentration, financial markets and macroeconomic imbalances have held stable since 
the last FSR (Chart 3.1).3 Specifically, the indicators relating to credit, liquidity and 
macroeconomic imbalances are in a normal or alert-free situation. 
In the case of credit, this is due mainly to fact that negative though moderate growth 
rates continue to be observed in the cases of lending both to households and non-
financial corporations. The indicators of liquidity also remain in a favourable position, 
both those relative to bank balance sheets and those relating to market liquidity. 
The category of macroeconomic imbalances still remains at alert-free levels, despite the slight 
deterioration in the current account balance as at June 2018 (see Chart 3.4.B). Other factors 
that have contributed to keeping this category stable are the slight improvements in the budget 
deficit and net external debt indicators, even though both remain at high absolute levels.
1  The definitions of the main categories correspond to those established by the European Systemic Risk Board in 
its Recommendation ESRB/2013/1 on intermediate objectives and instruments of macroprudential policy.
2  See Mencía, J. and Saurina, J. (2016) “Macroprudential policy: objectives, instruments and indicators”. 
Occasional Paper 1601, Banco de España.
3  The map of indicators includes a set of indicators classified in five categories. The credit category groups 
together indicators on the changes in and degree of disequilibrium in total and bank credit to households, non-
financial corporations and the entire non-financial private sector; the levels and debt burden of these sectors; 
interest rates on new lending business and on outstanding balances; and changes and imbalances in house 
prices. The liquidity category includes indicators on bank and market liquidity. The concentration category 
includes indicators on total bank credit concentration in different sectors and by type of borrower. The financial 
markets category groups indicators on correlations and interconnectedness between banking institutions and on 
systemic stress in different markets. The macroeconomic imbalances category includes indicators on external 
debt, the public sector and the current account balance.
3.1   Analysis of systemic 
vulnerabilities
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The financial markets indicators remain at a low level of alert. This category showed no 
warning signs until early 2016 (Chart 3.2).4 Since then, it has remained at a level of low 
alert, as a result of a series of short, recurring episodes of spikes in volatility. Notable 
among these episodes was that in mid-2016 owing to the Brexit referendum result. More 
recently, the latest episodes of this type indicated in Chapter 1 have been the rises in 
instability recorded within the euro area (Italy) and in the emerging economies (Turkey and 
Argentina). Owing to the limited impact to date of these latest two events on the Spanish 
financial market, there have been no changes in the level of warning signs of this indicator. 
The concentration indicators are also holding stable at an intermediate level. In this case, the 
exposure to the sectors related to the last crisis continues to diminish, although the weight 
of credit for larger operations remains stable.
Finally, the last row of Chart 3.2 shows the changes in the indicators on the situation of the 
economy and the financial system. Unlike the other indicators considered in the map of 
vulnerabilities, these do not seek to capture imbalances that might derive in future problems 
(indicators that anticipate banking crises), but rather the situation of the business cycle at 
each point in time. Currently, these indicators reflect an economic and financial situation 
that has improved significantly since 2014, and one that has been stable in the past year. 
In sum, the map of indicators shows that the Spanish economy is currently in a low phase of 
the financial cycle that has been accompanied by a gradual economic recovery in recent 
quarters. It will be necessary to closely monitor developments over the coming quarters to 
assess to what extent the rise in shorter-dated risks identified in Chapter 1 begins to affect the 
cyclical vulnerabilities picked up by this tool. So far, the analysis of vulnerabilities presented 
through the colour scheme does not advise activating cyclical macroprudential instruments. 
This conclusion coincides with the analysis published quarterly by the Banco de España 
4  This chart shows the developments over time in the vulnerabilities in Chart 3.1 through a colour scheme that 
enables both the historical course of the indicators and the intensity of the warning signs to be observed. Intensity 
increases as the tone draws closer to red, while the colour green depicts a normal situation. The upper part of the 
chart presents the same categories considered in Chart 3.1, with an additional breakdown by sub-category that 
enables the developments in the vulnerabilities to be observed with greater granularity. 
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high risk. The shaded band denotes the period of the last crisis.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 81 FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT, NOVEMBER 2018
on the indicators that steer decisions on the Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB), where 
it has been decided to hold the CCyB rate applicable to domestic credit exposures at 0% 
since its implementation on 1 January 2016.5 In the particular case of setting the CCyB, the 
Banco de España analyses the information from quantitative indicators together with an 
analysis of qualitative information and its expert judgement as part of a “guided 
discretionality” arrangement. 
Among the set of quantitative indicators steering decisions on the CCyB, the main reference 
is the credit-to-GDP gap. This is defined as the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio 
and its long-term trend, determined by statistical procedures. This indicator has been 
proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and is incorporated into 
current European and Spanish legislation as guidance for setting the CCyB.6 As at March 
2018 data, the value for the gap was –50.1 pp. This value is far lower than the level that 
advises activation of the instrument.7 The developments in the gap are shown in Chart 3.3.A 
along with the attendant components, the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-term trend. In 
recent quarters the credit-to-GDP ratio has continued on the declining trend on which it 
embarked as from the last crisis. This reduction is similar to that occurring in the long-term 
trend, which explains why the values for the gap have stabilised at around –50 pp over the 
last six quarters. 
The change in the gap in year-on-year terms, and the breakdown into its different 
components (GDP, credit to households, credit to non-financial corporations and long-term 
trend), is presented in Chart 3.3.B. While the trend component has continued contributing 
slightly to closing the gap since the end of the crisis, all the components of the credit-to-
GDP ratio continue contributing to making it more negative. On one hand, the numerator 
5  “The Banco de España maintains the countercyclical capital buffer at 0%”, Banco de España Press Release 
dated 28 September 2018.
6  Directive 2013/36/EU (CRD IV), Law 10/2014, Royal Decree 84/2015, Banco de España Circular 2/2016 and 
ESRB Recommendation 2014/1.
7  The Banco de España, in accordance with BCBS guidance, considers the level of 2 pp as the reference for a 
potential activation of the CCyB.
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of the ratio continues to diminish, owing to the negative growth rates of credit, both to 
households and non-financial corporations. Of these two activities, the decline in credit for 
non-financial corporations has had a slightly greater weight in recent quarters. On the other, 
the denominator of the ratio has increased owing to the positive growth of GDP. While the long-
term trend also continues to evidence a declining tendency, the effect on the reduction in the 
credit-to-GDP ratio has been proportionately greater, keeping the gap practically unchanged. 
The statistical procedure used to calculate the trend means that said trend adapts very 
gradually to the current environment, in which the level of the credit-to-GDP ratio has fallen 
significantly following the crisis.8 Given the strong inertia in the trend, the credit-to-GDP gap 
will not foreseeably undergo changes in sign over a prolonged period of time. However, the 
framework for the activation of the CCyB also considers a set of complementary quantitative 
indicators as guidelines for setting the CCyB, with information not captured by the credit-
to-GDP gap. In particular, indicators related to credit growth, house prices, debt service 
and the current account balance (Chart 3.4) are considered.9 
8   The procedure in question is a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 400,000. This 
parameter, which is particularly high, is designed to estimate a very mild trend that does not react to short-term 
movements.
9   A technical analysis of the selection of indicators used can be consulted in Castro, C., Estrada, A. and Martínez, 
J. (2016). The Countercyclical Capital Buffer in Spain: An Analysis of Key Guiding Indicators. Working Paper No. 
1601. Banco de España.
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While at present all these indicators also show signs consistent with the decision to maintain 
the CCyB at 0%, recent developments in some of them indicate that warning signs liable to 
activate the CCyB might arise before the credit-to-GDP gap is able to reflect these changes. 
In particular, the indicators related to imbalances in house prices continue to show negative 
values (Chart 3.4.A), but a clear tendency towards their correction can be observed since 
the end of the crisis.10 Also, the dispersion of the values of this group of indicators has 
diminished, suggesting greater consistency in the signals they emit. 
Likewise, the course of the current account balance shows that, although the values for this 
indicator remain in positive territory or in surplus (Chart 3.4.B), they have fallen considerably 
during this year. However, the credit intensity indicator (Chart 3.4.C), which captures the 
annual change in credit relative to GDP, continues to show net reductions in the outstanding 
balance of credit to the non-financial private sector. Lastly, the indicator of debt service in 
the private sector continues to reveal that this variable remains on a debt-reduction path.
These differences in the course of the indicators highlight the importance of the ongoing 
monitoring of each of them, in order to subsequently assess them as a whole, given that the 
warning signs might not arise simultaneously in all of them. 
In addition to the monitoring of other individual indicators, it may be important to complement 
the signals of the credit-to-GDP gap with more technical tools, mainly those based on 
models that allow credit levels to be linked to fundamentals. Box 3.1 outlines some recent 
developments at the Banco de España in this connection.
10  The five indicators comprising the house prices category are: i) the prices gap in real terms constructed as the 
difference between observed prices and their long-term trend; ii) the gap in the ratio of house prices to 
household disposable income calculated as the difference between this ratio and its long-term trend; iii) 
econometric model that compares house prices in real terms with estimates obtained from the long-term trends 
of household disposable income and mortgage interest rates; iv) gap in the house prices/rental prices ratio, 
constructed as the difference between the values of the ratio and their long-term trend; v) econometric model 
that compares house prices in real terms with estimated long-term equilibria considering variables related to 
household disposable income, mortgage interest rates and fiscal effects. In all cases the long-term trends are 
obtained with a one-sided Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter equal to 400,000.
…which also point 
to maintaining the CCyB 
at 0%, although the recent 
changes in some of them 
indicate that warning signs 
for activation might arise 
before the credit-to-GDP gap 
reflects these changes 
It is important to complement 
the individual indicators 
with models that link credit 
levels to fundamentals 
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BOX 3.1ANALYTICAL MODELS FOR THE EVALUATION OF CYCLICAL SYSTEMIC RISK
The credit-to-GDP indicator may evidence limitations in countries 
that have witnessed very sharp growth and declines in credit. These 
limitations may translate into potential sub-optimal CCyB-setting 
decisions if used mechanically. As discussed, the Hodrick-Prescot 
filter used in calculating the trend of the credit-to-GDP ratio shows 
strong inertia, which prevents it from adapting rapidly to the change 
in the credit market situation. This adds extensive negative bias to 
the value of the credit-to-GDP gap, which will prevent it from 
promptly detecting warning signs consistent with changes in the 
credit cycle in the years immediately following a crisis such as that 
experienced by the Spanish banking sector. 
To counter the limitations of the credit-to-GDP gap, growing attention 
is being dedicated, along with the aforementioned analysis of 
complementary indicators, to the development of complementary 
models for the estimation of levels of disequilibrium in the credit 
cycle based on fundamentals, in order to lessen reliance on purely 
statistical techniques. In one of these papers,1 two alternative 
methodologies for estimating disequilibria in the credit cycle are 
explored. The adjustment provided by these models is compared 
for the six biggest EU economies with data since 1970.2 The 
first method proposed is a semi-structural unobserved components 
model (UCM Model), and the second a vectorial error correction model 
(VEC Model).3 Compared with the Basel gap, the proposed 
models tend to provide more accurate signs of the build-up of 
cyclical risk, and react in a more stable fashion to abrupt changes in 
credit growth or in other economic relationships. 
Chart A compares the results of the new estimates of credit 
imbalance for Spain derived from the proposed models with the 
Basel gap. Several notable conclusions may be drawn from the 
analysis. First, the Basel gap is seen to have not provided signs of 
imbalance before the two systemic events that occurred in Spain in 
the late 1970s and during the 1990s. By contrast, these two crises 
would have been identified by the new analytical models, albeit 
with nuances. The UCM model would have appropriately signalled 
the late-1970s crisis, but not the systemic event in the 1990s. For its 
part, the VEC model would actually have signalled both events, 
although in the case of the first crisis the signals tend to be belated. 
Both the analytical models and the Basel gap would have shown 
signs of imbalance before the last crisis. However, the Basel gap 
would have generated signs of imbalance on a much more 
substantial scale excessively ahead (more than 10 years) of the 
outbreak of the crisis. The estimates obtained with the analytical 
models appear to be more stable, emitting in both cases clear 
warning signs around five years before the crisis. This result would 
suggest that the growth of credit observed from 1999 to 2004 may 
have been related to changes in economic fundamentals in Spain 
following euro area membership. 
Finally, while the Basel gap shows very significant negative bias after 
the last crisis, the estimates of negative imbalances derived from the 
new models tend to stabilise shortly after the end of the last crisis. 
Indeed, contrary to the Basel gap, the new indicators can be seen to 
show gaps that have begun to rise, even though they remain in 
negative territory. These estimates would be more in keeping with 
the recovery phase in the financial cycle at which Spain currently 
stands, and in turn may appear more consistent with the information 
arising from the complementary indicators shown in Chart 3.4. 
Accordingly, monitoring them might enhance the ability to swiftly 
detect new imbalances in the credit cycle in the coming years. 
1  Galán, J. E. and Mencía, J. (2018). Empirical Assessment of Alternative 
Structural Methods for Identifying Cyclical Systemic Risk in Europe. 
Working Paper No. 1825, Banco de España.
2  The sample comprises Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom.
3  The variables considered in both models are total credit to the non-finan-
cial private sector, gross domestic product, house prices and long-term 
interest rates.
SOURCE: Galán and Mencía (2018).
a The shaded area shows three periods of financial stress since 1970, corresponding to two periods of systemic banking crisis (1978 Q1 to 1985 Q3 and 2009 
Q1 to 2013 Q4) and an idiosyncratic event (1993 Q3 to 1994 Q3).
b The credit-to-GDP gap represents the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio and its long-term trend, expressed in percentage points. The imbalances 
arising from the analytical models represent the deviations of the credit-to-GDP ratio from the estimated equilibria, considering fundamental variables, expressed 
in logarithmic terms.
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
70 73 76 80 83 86 90 93 96 00 03 06 10 13 16
UCM MODEL  VEC MODEL CREDIT-TO-GDP GAP (right-hand scale)
% pp
Chart A
ESTIMATES OF CREDIT IMBALANCES IN SPAIN. ANALYTICAL MODELS AND BASEL GAP (a) (b)
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ANNEX 1
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Difference between funds received in liquidity-providing operations and funds delivered in absorbing operations. June 2018 data.
b Difference calculated in basis points.
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BANCO DE ESPAÑA PUBLICATIONS
The Banco de España publishes various types of documents that provide information on 
its activity (economic reports, statistical information, research papers, etc.). The full list of 
Banco de España publications can be found on its website at http://www.bde.es/f/
webbde/Secciones/Publicaciones/Relacionados/Fic/Catalogopublicaciones.pdf.
Most of these documents are available in pdf format and can be downloaded free of charge 
from the Banco de España website, http://www.bde.es/bde/en/secciones/informes/. 
A request for others can be made to the following e-mail address: publicaciones@bde.es.

